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Digital wallets, such as ApplePay and Google Pay, are smart payment devices 
that can integrate payments with two-way, realtime communications of any type of 
data. Integration of payments with realtime communications holds out tremendous 
promise for consumers and merchants alike: the combination, in a single, convenient 
platform, of search functions, advertising, payment, shipping, customer service, and 
loyalty programs. Such an integrated retail platform offers consumers a faster and 
easier way to transact, and offers brick-and-mortar retailers an eCommerce-type 
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ability to identify, attract, and retain customers. At the same time, however, digital 
wallets present materially different risks for both consumers and merchants than 
traditional plastic card payments precisely because of their smart nature. 
For consumers, digital wallets can trigger an unfavorable shift in the applicable 
legal regime governing the transactions, increase fraud risk, create confusion 
regarding error resolution, expose consumers to non–FDIC-insured accounts, and 
substantially erode transactional privacy. These risks are often not salient to 
consumers, who thus cannot distinguish between different digital wallets on the basis 
of risk. Consumers’ inability to protect against these risks points to a need for 
regulatory intervention by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to ensure 
minimum standards for digital wallets. 
For merchants, digital wallets can divest valuable customer information used for 
antifraud, advertising, loyalty, and customer service purposes. Digital wallets can 
also facilitate poaching of customers by competitors, impair merchants’ customer 
relationship management, deprive merchants of influence over consumers’ payment 
choice and routing, increase fraud risk, subject merchants to patent infringement 
liability, and ultimately increase the costs of accepting payments. Merchants are 
constrained in their ability to refuse or condition payments from digital wallets based 
on the risks presented because of merchant rules promulgated by credit card networks. 
These rules raise antitrust concerns because they foreclose entry to those digital wallets 
that offer merchants the most attractive valuation proposition: wallets that do not use 
the credit card networks for payments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Digital wallets are poised to transform the world of consumer payments and 
commerce. Digital wallets are computer software applications that store and 
transmit payment authorization data for one or more credit or deposit accounts. 
After a consumer loads her payment account data into a digital wallet, the 
digital wallet functions as a payment device for the selected account, 
transmitting the data to merchants to authorize payment. By storing payment 
authorization data, digital wallets function analogously to physical wallets that 
contain multiple payment cards used to transmit payment authorization data. 
Digital wallets differ from traditional plastic cards in that they are 
(potentially) smart wallets. Traditional payment cards are “dumb” devices that 
are capable of doing a single thing and nothing more: transmitting payment 
308 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 305 
authorization data to a merchant. In contrast, a digital wallet can provide 
two-way communication between a consumer and a merchant. That 
communication need not be limited to payment authorization data, but could 
include virtually any type of data. For example, a digital wallet can be used to 
transmit realtime geolocation data, coupons, and loyalty program information 
about the consumer to the merchant. It can also be used to transmit 
advertising, sales offers, shipping information, and receipts from the merchant 
to the consumer in real time. This means that a digital wallet can potentially 
integrate payments into a comprehensive digital retail services suite of 
advertising, search, payment, customer service, and loyalty program features. 
Despite the basic functional similarity to traditional plastic payment cards, 
digital wallets can present materially different risks and costs for consumers 
and merchants. Critically, these risks and costs vary among digital wallets. 
Digital wallets involve a much broader range of form factors, technologies, and 
business models than traditional plastic cards, and the cost–benefit 
proposition of making or accepting digital wallet payments varies by product. 
For consumers, digital wallets can unfavorably shift the legal regime that 
governs the transactions, expose individual consumers to additional fraud 
risk, sow confusion regarding error resolution, expose consumers to 
non–FDIC-insured accounts, and substantially erode transactional privacy. 
For merchants, the risks from digital wallets include losing valuable customer 
information, poaching of customers by competitors, and impairing customer 
relationship management, as well as increases in fraud risk, patent 
infringement liability, and the cost of accepting payments.1 
Unfortunately, neither consumers nor merchants can effectively protect their 
interests with respect to digital wallets, albeit for different reasons. Although 
consumers have a largely unconstrained ability to pick and choose which digital 
wallet(s) to use, this ability affords little market-based protection for two reasons. 
First, the types of risks digital wallets pose to consumers are unlikely to be salient 
in their decisionmaking. Second, even if these risks were salient, consumers lack 
the ability to distinguish between digital wallets with regard to these risks. 
Consumers’ lack of understanding of the material risks involved with digital 
wallets and their inability to protect their interests when selecting digital wallets 
points to the need for regulatory intervention to mandate minimum consumer 
protections for digital wallets. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) has authority to undertake such regulation. 
Merchants face a different problem. Merchants have only limited ability to 
refuse or condition acceptance of payments from particular digital wallets. The 
three major payment card networks—American Express, MasterCard, and Visa 
(collectively, the Card Networks)—have network rules applicable to merchants 
 
1 Other risks, such as compliance with anti–money laundering laws, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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that accept their cards. The Card Networks’ rules require merchants to “Honor 
All Wallets” without discrimination. Specifically, the Honor All Wallets rules 
require merchants that choose to accept a Card Network’s payments using a 
particular type of communications technology to accept the Card Network’s 
payments without discrimination from all devices that utilize that 
communications technology. These rules force merchants to take various types 
of digital wallets if they accept regular credit and debit payments—which is a 
sine qua non of participating in modern retail markets. 
For example, a merchant that accepts traditional MasterCard magnetic 
stripe devices must accept MasterCard payments from all devices using 
magnetic stripe data, including mobile devices such as SamsungPay that 
utilize magnetic stripe emulation technology to mimic the electromagnetic 
field created by a magnetic stripe card. Likewise, if a merchant accepts Visa 
contactless payments from credit cards with Near Field Communications 
(NFC) “contactless” chips, the merchant must also accept Visa contactless 
payments from all mobile devices that use NFC.2 The merchant could not 
accept NFC payments only from mobile devices that make payments through 
lower-cost systems like PIN-debit and automated clearing houses (ACH).3 
Under the Honor All Wallets rules, then, a merchant must accept 
payments from all payment devices that utilize a technology if the merchant 
accepts any payments using that technology. As a result, merchants cannot 
refuse to accept payments from payment devices that impose greater risks and 
costs upon them. Merchants cannot price for the risks created by particular 
payment devices, nor can they contractually reallocate those risks to the digital 
wallet provider. Indeed, absent direct physical observation, merchants are 
presently unable to identify what form factor was used to make a payment, so 
merchants cannot even distinguish which digital wallet is being used. 
In sum, the Honor All Wallets rules mean that merchants lose control 
over what risks they accept and on what terms. When accepting payment 
 
2 NFC is a type of high-frequency radio frequency identification (RFID) communication. 
RFID usually refers to a combination of a separate “tag” and “reader” that communicate through an 
antenna, whereas an NFC card functions sometimes as a tag and sometimes as a reader, as illustrated 
by “tap” transactions between two NFC devices. NFC devices are made to specifications 
promulgated by the NFC Forum, which certifies devices for compliance with these standards. The 
NFC Forum’s top-level members include MasterCard and Visa. For more on NFC, see generally 
THOMAS LERNER, MOBILE PAYMENT (2013), and JOHNSON I. AGBINYA, PRINCIPLES OF 
INDUCTIVE NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATIONS FOR INTERNET OF THINGS (2011). 
3 ACH is an electronic payment method for moving funds between accounts at depository 
institutions. There is no access device for using ACH. Instead, funds are transferred with bank 
account and routing numbers. Direct deposit and automatic bill pay are two common uses of ACH. 
For more on ACH, see generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER BANKING AND 
PAYMENTS LAW § 5.1.5.2 (5th ed. 2013). 
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from any particular digital wallet, a merchant is forced to open a digital 
Pandora’s Box of an unknown set of risks. 
This Article considers the potential legal and business issues digital wallets raise 
for both consumers and merchants, and proposes a pair of necessary interventions 
in the digital wallet marketplace. First, it argues the CFPB should issue regulations 
under its power to regulate “abusive” practices and services to require minimum 
standards for default payment options, security, deposit insurance coverage, and 
privacy. Second, it argues the Honor All Wallet rules are likely antitrust violations 
that inhibit the development of digital wallet technology by making merchants 
reluctant to accept digital wallets and by making it difficult for the digital wallets 
with the most attractive value propositions for merchants to gain market share. In 
particular, the Honor All Wallets rules foreclose entry into the digital wallet market 
for digital wallets that use lower cost payment systems than the Card 
Networks—namely PIN-debit and ACH—and thereby help the Card 
Networks maintain their market power in the face of a technological 
transition from plastic cards to digital wallets. Ironically, then, the Honor All 
Wallets rules may well be inhibiting rather than encouraging adoption of digital 
wallets because the rules enable bad wallets to preserve market access such 
that the bad can crowd out the good. 
This Article contributes to the consumer protection, antitrust, and payment 
systems literatures. Consumer protection literature is only just starting to 
address the tremendous and ongoing technological changes in payments.4 This 
Article lays out the rationale and authority for CFPB intervention to require 
minimum product standards in the digital wallet market. 
The payments industry has been beset with antitrust litigation in the United 
States for the past two decades, focusing on the Card Networks’ system for 
setting interbank fees on payments (which get passed through to merchants and 
consumers), including various Card Network rules that prohibit merchants from 
taking actions to steer consumers to cheaper payment methods. This litigation 
has resulted in two of the largest private settlements in history—a $3 billion class 
action settlement in 20035 and a $7 billion class action settlement in 2013 (which 
was subsequently thrown out on appeal)6—and a pair of Department of Justice 
 
4 See, e.g., Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments 
Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493 (2016); Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77 
(2013); Mark E. Budnitz, The Legal Framework of Mobile Payments: Gaps, Ambiguities, and Overlap (Ga. State 
Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-22, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841701 
[https://perma.cc/BCA8-4U99]; Niels Vandezande, Mobile Wallets and Virtual Alternative Currencies Under 
the EU Legal Framework on Electronic Payments (Interdisciplinary Ctr. for Law & ICT Working Paper 16/2013, 
2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325410 [https://perma.cc/H5VK-KDGL]. 
5 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff ’d 
sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
6 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d, 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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suits.7 The same practices were also targeted by part of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20108 and have been the focus 
of intense regulatory scrutiny outside the United States.9 
At issue in much of the litigation and regulatory reforms is the application 
of antitrust law to so-called “two-sided” markets—markets in which there are 
two types of “consumers” of a product. In the case of payments, the two types 
of consumers are merchants and actual consumers. A sizeable scholarly 
literature has emerged on two-sided markets10 and on the application of 
antitrust law to those markets, particularly with reference to payment cards.11 
 
7 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming a district court’s ruling that 
MasterCard and Visa’s dual exclusivity structure for issuers violated antitrust law); United States v. Am. 
Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding American Express’s antisteering rules to be 
antitrust violations), rev’d & remanded, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Final Judgment as to Defs. 
Mastercard Int’l & Visa Inc., United States v. Am. Express Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87560 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 20, 2011) (No. CV-10-4496) (detailing terms of a consent decree between the Government, MasterCard, 
and Visa in a suit brought against American Express, Mastercard, and Visa over antisteering rules). 
8 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 920, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068-74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2012)). 
9 See, e.g., Regulation 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on 
interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, 2015 O.J. (L 123) 10-11 (capping interchange fees for 
debit and credit card transactions); Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard v. Comm’n, 2014 Curia ¶ 168, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=1&part=
1&mode=lst&docid=147066&occ=first&dir=&cid=1142943 [https://perma.cc/7CGF-TUHD] (rejecting 
MasterCard’s appeal after the European Commission brought a successful antitrust challenge to MasterCard’s 
cross-border interchange fees); RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., COMMON BENCHMARK FOR THE SETTING 
OF CREDIT CARD INTERCHARGE FEES 1 (2005), https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-
infrastructure/credit-cards/cc-fees-benchmark/pdf/cc-fees-benchmark.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6X4-2LZN] 
(limiting interchange fees for Australian credit card transactions); see also Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The 
Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1389 n.241 (2008) (noting that 
Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden ban surcharge restrictions for credit and debit cards, while 
the U.K. bans surcharge restrictions only for credit cards). 
10 See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668 (2006); 
Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 
RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 
RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); Roberto Roson, Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey, 4 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 142 (2005); E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1642 (2010); 
Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON. 44 (2004). 
11 See, e.g., DAVID S. EVANS, INTERCHANGE FEES (2011); Hélène Bourguignon et al., Card 
Surcharges and Cash Discounts: Simple Economics and Regulatory Lessons, 10 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 13 
(2014); Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks, 63 
ANTITRUST L.J. 643 (1995); Sujit Chakravorti, Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature, 
2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 50 (2003); Benjamin Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive 
Intermediation, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1283 (2015); Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle 
for Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 425 (2007) [hereinafter Levitin, Payment Wars]; 
Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden 
Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265 (2005); Levitin, supra note 9; Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The 
Social Costs of Credit Card Merchants Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008); Jean-Charles Rochet & 
Jean Tirole, An Economic Analysis of the Determinants of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems, 2 REV. 
NETWORK ECON. 69 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Julian Wright, Credit Card Interchange Fees, 34 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1788 (2010); Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent, The No Surcharge Rule and Card 
User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network, 5 REV. NETWORK ECON. 72 (2006); Steven C. Salop 
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Courts, however, are only just beginning to grapple with the issue.12 This 
Article situates the Honor All Wallets rules in this context as representing a 
new application of the antitrust problems that arose from the related Honor 
All Cards rules, which require merchants to accept all of a Card Network’s 
plastic cards if the merchant accepts any of the Network’s cards. 
The Article also contributes to the payment systems literature by serving 
as a technical guide to digital wallets and their underlying security 
technologies: Chip (EMV) cards, tokenization, and encryption. The literature 
on payment systems has not kept pace with technological innovation, and this 
Article fills an important lacuna. Without an understanding of the technical 
issues, lawyers cannot identify the legal issues involved with digital wallets. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the traditional structure 
and economics of payment transactions and how digital wallets change it. 
Section II.A examines the benefits and costs of digital wallets to consumers 
and presents the argument that the CFPB should undertake rulemaking to 
address digital wallets. Section II.B examines the benefits and costs of digital 
wallets to merchants and presents the argument that the Honor All Wallets 
rules are likely an antitrust violation inhibiting entry into the market by digital 
wallets that use cheaper payment methods, such as PIN-debit and ACH. 
I. DIGITAL WALLETS AND MOBILE PAYMENTS 
A. Flows of Funds and Data in Payment Card Transactions 
A traditional card-based payment, whether credit or debit, involves five parties: 
the consumer, the merchant, the consumer’s bank, the merchant’s bank, and the 
payment card network. The consumer’s bank is known as the “issuer” because it 
issues the card to the consumer.13 The card contains payment authorization data 
that allows the consumer to access either a line of credit with the issuer (for a credit 
card) or a demand deposit account (for a debit card). The merchant’s bank is known 
as the “acquirer” because it acquires the payment from the merchant by paying the 
 
& Fiona Scott Morton, Developing an Administrable MFN Policy, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2013, at 15; Adam 
J. Levitin, Cross-Routing: PIN and Signature-Debit Interchangeability Under the Durbin Amendment (Georgetown 
Univ. Law Ctr. Bus. Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1681078, 
2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rr-commpublic/levitin_paper_20101124.pdf [https://
perma.cc/88DK-9C2G]; Alan O. Sykes, Antitrust Issues in Two-Sided Network Markets: Lessons from In Re 
Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-45, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2530657&rec=1&srcabs=2681304&alg=1&pos=3 [https://perma.cc/4BPQ-Y3M3]. 
12 To date, only one appellate decision has directly addressed this issue: United States v. Am. 
Express Co., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding the Government did not meet its burden to prove 
an antitrust violation), cert. granted, No. 16-454, 2017 WL 2444673 (Oct. 16, 2017) . 
13 In the American Express system, the payment card network also serves as the acquirer, and 
often as the issuer, although American Express has allowed third-party issuance since 2005. 
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merchant an amount discounted from the face amount of the transaction. This 
discount is known as the “merchant discount fee.” The merchant discount fee is 
individually negotiated between acquirers and merchants. The acquirer will then 
present the transaction for payment to the issuer through the payment card 
network, which functions as a clearinghouse between acquirers and issuers.14 
The payment card network promulgates the rules for the involved parties. 
Formally, the payment card network has contractual relationships with only 
the acquirer and issuer banks. Merchants find themselves subject to card 
network rules by virtue of the rules’ incorporation in merchants’ contracts 
with their acquirer banks. 
The payment card networks charge acquirers and issuers various network 
fees for their services. The payment card networks also collect an interchange 
fee from the acquirer that is remitted to the issuer bank in the form of an 
additional discount from the transaction’s face value. Interchange fees are 
formally an interbank fee paid by acquirers to issuers, but they are not 
individually negotiated between acquirers and issuers. Instead, interchange 
fees are determined by a fee schedule set by the payment card network. The 
interchange fee varies by merchant type and transaction volume, as well as by 
the features of the consumer’s payment card (credit, debit, level of rewards on 
the card, etc.), rather than by the banks’ risk characteristics. Interchange fees 
are typically an ad valorum fee plus a flat fee, although for debit card 
transactions the interchange fee is sometimes a capped flat fee. 
Because acquirers are faced with an interchange fee on every transaction, 
acquirers set the merchant discount fee above the interchange fee plus 
network fees; the interchange fee plus the network fees are a floor for the 
merchant discount fee. Indeed, some acquirers offer pricing that is explicitly 
“interchange plus,” meaning that there is direct pass-through to the merchant 
of the interchange fee plus an additional margin for the acquirer. 
Consequently, merchants have the ability to negotiate only the acquirer’s 
merchant discount fee over and above the interchange fee. 
Thus in a traditional payment card transaction the cardholder transmits her 
payment authorization data, including her primary account number (PAN) to 
the merchant, which relays the information to the acquirer bank and thence 
through the Card Network to the issuer for authorization. If the transaction is 
authorized, the issuer will remit funds to the network, which will send them on 
to the acquirer bank and thence to the merchant. At each step of the way, 
 
14 Acquirers will frequently outsource many of their functions to third-party payment processors and 
independent service organizations (ISO). See Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card 
Processors: A Look Inside the Black Box, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 27, 31 (2006). Although 
processors and ISOs play a major practical role in card payments, they are functionally acting as agents 
between the acquirer and merchant, rather than as a foundational part of the card payment system. 
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however, the remitted funds are reduced by the associated offsetting fee: the 
interchange fee, the network fees, and the merchant discount fee.15 Figure 1 
illustrates the flow of data and money in a payment card network. 
 
Figure 1: Payment Card Transaction Overview 
The value received by the merchant in a traditional payment card 
transaction is not limited to the transaction amount minus the merchant 
discount fee. An important part of the value to a merchant of a payment card 
transaction comes in the form of information about the consumer. Payment 
 
15 The technical details of the data transmission process are slightly different for credit cards and 
most signature-authorized debit cards than for PIN-authorized debit cards. Credit cards and most 
signature-debit cards use two separate messages among the merchant, acquirer, payment network, and 
issuer for authorization of the transaction, clearing, and settlement of the funds into the merchant’s account 
at the acquirer. One message contains the authorization request, while a second message will contain the 
clearing and settlement communications. Authorization is separated from clearing and settlement because 
clearing and settlement are not conducted separately in real time for individual transactions, but rather 
processed periodically in batches. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, supra note 3, § 5.1.5.2. 
PIN-debit cards, in contrast, use a single message for authorization, clearing, and settlement. There is, 
nonetheless, only a single settlement, which occurs on an individual transaction basis in near-realtime, just like 
an ATM withdrawal. Even with single messaging, however, settlement is still done on a periodic, aggregate 
basis, rather than by individual transaction. For a detailed overview of MasterCard’s clearing and settlement 
functions, which are emblematic of those of other card networks, see generally Susan Herbst-Murphy, 
Clearing and Settlement of Interbank Card Transactions: A MasterCard Tutorial for Federal Reserve Payments 
Analysts, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. (Oct. 2013), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/consumer-credit-
and-payments/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2013/D-2013-October-Clearing-
Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/94S5-R4HW]. 
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card transactions are much more informationally rich than cash transactions 
because they associate a particular, identifiable consumer with a transaction. 
In a traditional payment card transaction, the cardholder’s PAN is fully 
visible to the merchant. The PAN is a customer-specific identifier that is a 
source of significant value to the merchant. Merchants can mine PAN data to 
correlate past purchases made using the same PAN and use this information 
for fraud detection, advertising, customer loyalty programs, and to facilitate 
returns and exchanges. The ability to track a customer’s purchase history by 
PAN means that merchants can set up fraud tripwires for purchases made in 
unusual locations, at unusual times, for unusual amounts, or even for unusual 
items. At the same time, the ability to track purchase history by PAN enables 
merchants to target advertising and loyalty programs at particular consumers 
and for particular merchandise. For example, a merchant that notices a 
pattern of purchases of baby-related items might choose to send the consumer 
advertisements and coupons that focus on baby products over the next year, 
because baby-related purchases by parents are unlikely to occur only once. 
The ability to track PANs also facilitates customer relationship management. 
For example, a husband and wife who share a credit card account will each have a 
card with the same PAN. An erroneous purchase by the hapless husband can easily 
be returned by the wife if she has a receipt because her card’s PAN will match that 
of the card used by her husband to make the purchase. Thus the ability to see and 
track a consumer’s PAN is valuable for merchants in a range of applications. 
B. Digital Wallets 
Digital wallets build on the traditional payment card network structure. 
Though digital wallets do not change the fundamental transaction, they 
instead may change the method and nature of the data communicated 
between consumers and merchants. 
A digital wallet is a computer software application that stores and 
transmits payment authorization data for one or more credit or deposit 
accounts. Once a consumer loads her payment account data into a digital 
wallet, the digital wallet can then be used as a payment device for that 
account, transmitting the data to merchants to authorize payment. 
1. Types of Digital Wallets 
The term “digital wallet” encompasses a broad range of products. These 
products vary in four dimensions: acceptance, funding, pass-through versus staged 
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status, and form factor.16 Acceptance refers to where the wallet can be used to 
make payments. Some wallets are “general purpose wallets” that can be used for 
payments at any merchant, while others are “business wallets” that can be used 
only at a single merchant or group of associated merchants, much like a private 
label credit card. ApplePay, Google Pay,17 SamsungPay, and PayPal all offer 
general purpose wallets. Retailers like Starbucks (which offers the most widely 
used mobile wallet by far18), Walmart, and Amazon.com offer single-business 
wallets, as do online retailers that store consumers’ payment information. 
Second, how the wallet is funded varies. Some digital wallets are “open 
wallets” that can be linked to any payment source (credit, debit, or ACH with 
any payment network brand or bank). Others are “limited-open wallets” that 
can be linked to a limited number of payment sources. Still other digital wallets 
are “bank-open wallets” that can be linked to payment source offered by a 
specific bank, or “brand-open wallets” that can be linked to any payment source 
offered by a particular payment network. (In some cases, the wallet is both bank- 
and brand-specific.) And, finally, wallets can be “closed wallets” linked only to a 
single payment source from a single bank or brand. Thus far, all major single 
business and multi-business wallets have been open wallets or limited open wallets. 
Table 1 summarizes the spending and funding possibilities for digital wallets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Digital wallets may differ in an additional dimension—the unit of account they use for 
transactions. This study does not address digital wallets that utilize so-called “cryptocurrencies”: 
private, digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, that are usually based on blockchain technology. 
17 Prior to 2018, Google Pay was two separate products: Android Pay (a pass-through wallet) and Google 
Wallet (a staged wallet). See Pali Bhat, Bringing It All Together with Google Pay, GOOGLE (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.blog.google/topics/shopping-payments/announcing-google-pay/. 
18 See Marcus Wohlson, Forget Apple Pay. The Master of Mobile Payments is Starbucks, WIRED (Nov. 3, 
2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/forget-apple-pay-master-mobile-payments-starbucks/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SGY-R6QG]. 
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Table 1: Digital Wallet Funding and Spending Possibilities 
 
 Open Wallet
Limited-Open 
Wallet Bank Wallet
Closed 
Wallet 
General 
Purpose 
ApplePay
 
Chase Pay 
PAYTOO 
Wallet 
Google Pay
Coin
Masterpass
Capital One 
Pay 
PayPal
SamsungPay
Square Cash
Citi Wallet 
(MC Only) 
Venmo
Zelle
Single-
Business 
Wallet 
Starbucks 
App
Various Online 
Retail Wallets 
  
Walmart Pay
Multibusiness 
Wallet 
Amazon.com
Currentc 
(Defunct) 
  
Levelup
Square 
Wallet 
(Defunct)
 
Third, digital wallets are either “pass-through” wallets or “staged” wallets. 
In a pass-through wallet, the digital device merely substitutes for a plastic card: 
instead of the payment authorization being stored on a card, it is stored on a 
phone or some other device. ApplePay and SamsungPay are pass-through 
wallets, and Google Pay offers a pass-through option. 
Other wallets, however, such as PayPal, Square Cash, and Venmo, are staged 
wallets, and Google Pay can be a staged wallet, depending on the funding 
source used. A payment from a consumer to a merchant with a staged wallet is 
divided into two distinct legs. First, there is a funding leg, in which the 
consumer makes funds available to the digital wallet. The funding comes from 
whatever source the consumer selects—a bank account, a credit card, a line of 
credit from the staged wallet provider, or a payment balance on the staged 
wallet. The second leg moves the funds from the staged wallet to the merchant. 
This second leg may involve a different payment method than the first leg: the 
staged wallet might be funded through a credit card, but the payment to the 
merchant might be through ACH, thereby enabling the staged wallet provider 
to arbitrage the difference between its funding and its payment costs. 
The staged wallet provider serves as an intermediary between the consumer 
and the merchant, accepting payment from the consumer and then relaying 
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payment to the merchant through a method of its own choosing.19 Because the 
staged wallet provider stands between the consumer and the merchant, the 
merchant may receive different transaction information than if it transacted 
directly with the consumer. Similarly, the financial institutions involved in the 
funding leg see only the transfer to the staged wallet; they have no visibility into 
the identity of the ultimate merchant recipient.20 Because of the two 
transactional legs in a staged wallet transaction, there is also the possibility of 
the consumer having a payment balance on the wallet—funds held by the 
wallet provider for the consumer, much like a bank deposit. Such payment 
balances are not possible on pass-through wallets. 
Fourth, digital wallets vary by form factor. Form factor variation is a major 
functional distinction between traditional plastic cards and digital wallets. While 
all digital wallets are software based, some are accessed through web browsers, 
others through mobile device apps, and some through both. Web-based wallets 
store the consumer’s payment data in the cloud and can be accessed by any device 
with a web browser, whether a desktop or a mobile device. Some web-based 
digital wallets, such as PayPal and Google Pay, are general-purpose wallets, which 
are not specific to any particular merchant. Most web-based digital wallets, 
however, are single-business wallets. And any merchant that stores consumer 
payment information in a way that it can be used for future transactions is 
offering a type of digital wallet. Thus many airlines, rental car companies, 
and Internet retailers offer digital wallets. Likewise, Amazon.com offers a 
multi-business wallet that can be used for payments to all Amazon.com sellers. 
2. Mobile Wallets 
Other digital wallets are “mobile wallets” that run on mobile devices, 
including smartphones, tablets, wearables, key fobs, and dongles. Some, such 
as Google Pay, ApplePay, and SamsungPay, are specific to the particular 
combination of software and hardware on certain devices. Others, such as the 
Starbucks app or PayPal, are apps that can run on multiple operating systems. 
Web-based wallets can of course be accessed from mobile devices, even if they 
 
19 A similar intermediation role is played on the merchant side by merchant aggregators such as 
Square, Etsy, iZettle, WyzAnt, and Stripe. Some digital wallet providers, such as PayPal and Amazon, 
are also merchant aggregators. The consumer essentially makes the payment to the merchant 
aggregator, which then relays the payment to the merchant. The merchant aggregator business model 
is based on the merchant aggregator having a lower cost of receiving payments than the merchants 
themselves and arbitraging that cost spread. Cf. Alice Chen, Merchant Account vs Processing Aggregators, 
PAYFIRMA (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.payfirma.com/grow-your-business/merchant-account-vs-
aggregator/ [https://perma.cc/AHJ8-ZBPV]. See generally LERNER, supra note 2. 
20 MasterCard and Visa have seen staged wallets as competitive threats. See MasterCard’s Wallet 
Fee: A Tool of Oppression, or One to Level the Acquiring Playing Field?, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Mar. 
22, 2013), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/3928 [https://perma.cc/CEJ6-REQF]. In 
2013, for instance, MasterCard imposed a fee on staged wallet transactions. Id. 
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do not have a specific mobile app (although some, like PayPal, do). Mobile 
wallets utilize a range of communications technologies for transmitting 
payment data from the device to merchants, including magnetic stripe 
emulation, NFC, Quick Recognition (QR) Code, Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low 
Energy, instant messaging, and the Internet. 
Confusingly, some digital wallets have both web-based and app-based 
versions. Likewise, the same device, such as a smartphone, can host multiple 
digital wallets, which may utilize different communications technologies. For 
example, an iPhone user could use both ApplePay and a free-standing digital 
wallet application that would make payments over the Internet. Even more 
confusingly, some digital wallets are able to be included in other digital wallets. 
Thus, Capital One Pay can be used as a free-standing digital wallet or included 
inside an ApplePay wallet. At the same time, however, Apple does not make 
the NFC chip in iPhones available to third-party apps.21 Thus, the only 
NFC-based digital wallet that can run on an iPhone is ApplePay, even though 
other digital wallets that do not use NFC can be used on an iPhone. In contrast, 
the NFC chip on Android devices is available to third-party developers. 
C. What Digital Wallets Change 
For payments processed through credit and debit card networks, digital 
wallets do not change the fundamental design of the five-party payment card 
system set up. Nor do they necessarily change the basic fee structure in the 
credit or debit card system, although they may reallocate some of the value 
in the system and possibly increase costs. To the extent that digital wallets 
provide the possibility of ACH payments, however, the fee structure is 
altered because in an ACH transition there are no interbank fees, only a small 
per transaction fee paid to the ACH operator.22 
What digital wallets do change, irrespective of how the payments are 
processed, is the possible range of communication technologies for transmitting 
payment authorization from consumers to merchants and, more importantly, the 
format of the payment authorization data. These changes are significant because 
they may affect the flow and control of consumer data. Finally, digital wallets 
 
21 See Rod Chester, Big Banks Drop all Complaints but One in Last-Ditch Fight Against ApplePay in ACCC 
Inquiry, NEWS CORP AUSTL. NETWORK (Feb. 13, 2017, 4:36 PM), http://www.news.com.au/technology/
gadgets/mobile-phones/big-banks-drop-all-complaints-but-one-in-lastditch-fight-against-apple-pay-in-accc-
inquiry/news-story/86437315691f6d8e5708d9793446f3e6 [https://perma.cc/WRY3-7NYV] (explaining how 
Australian banks fought Apple for NFC access). Apple appears to be moving to allow third-party NFC access. 
See Ben Lovejoy, Apple Opening Up (Some) Access to the iPhone’s NFC Chip in iOS 11, 9TO5MAC (June 7, 2017, 
4:00 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2017/06/07/apple-opening-up-some-access-to-the-iphones-nfc-chip-in-ios-
11/ [https://perma.cc/W7F6-EEBU]. 
22 In an ACH transaction, the merchant’s and consumer’s banks may charge additional fees to 
the merchant and consumer, respectively. 
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potentially change payments from an isolated one-way data flow to a richer, two-
way communications environment that encompasses the entire retail experience 
from advertising and search to purchase, shipping, returns, and customer loyalty. 
1. The Method of Transmission of Payment Authorization  
Data from Consumers to Merchants 
Digital wallets enable payments to be made from credit and demand deposit 
accounts using devices other than plastic credit and debit cards. In so doing, they 
expand the possible range of technologies used to transmit payment authorization 
from consumers to merchants. Transmission of the payment data in the rest of the 
payment network system (credit, debit, or ACH) remains unaffected by this 
change; ultimately, the consumer’s bank will only authorize the transaction if the 
authorization data comes to it through a payment network in which it participates. 
The traditional plastic payment card is merely an access device for an account, 
be it a demand deposit account or a line of credit. Accessing such an account 
requires transmission of proper authorization information to the bank that holds 
the account—the issuer. Access does not require a plastic card. Demand deposit 
accounts, for instance, do not require a plastic card for access; they may also be 
accessed by checks or by the account and routing number for ACH transactions. 
Likewise, even with a credit card account, authorization information can be 
transmitted in numerous forms by the consumer to the merchant, who then relays 
it to the issuer through a payment card network. For example, with a traditional 
card, the authorization data—the information on the front (and possibly the back) 
of the card—can be transmitted by swiping the card’s magnetic stripe through a 
magnetic stripe reader, by oral transmission to the merchant (such as in telephonic 
transactions), by manual input (such as with entry of the card information in a 
website), or, in recent years, by “contactless” transactions using NFC. 
Digital wallets potentially increase the possible methods for transmitting 
payment authorization data from a consumer to a merchant. Thus a digital 
wallet might use NFC technology, the Internet, text messaging, or magnetic 
stripe emulation for transmission of payment data.23 The use of different data 
transmission technologies can potentially increase the risks faced by a merchant 
when accepting payments, as discussed later in subsection II.B.2. 
 
 
23 The additional forms of data transmission are only feasible, of course, if a merchant is 
equipped to accept payments using such a technology. 
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Figure 2: Payment Card Transaction with Digital Wallet 
 
2. The Nature of Payment Authorization Data 
Digital wallets may also affect the format and nature of the information 
being transmitted from the consumer to the merchant, as well as from the 
merchant to the payment network. By altering the format and nature of the 
information transmitted, digital wallets may mask a cardholder’s PAN and 
thereby deprive the merchant of the informational value of the transaction. 
In a traditional credit or debit card transaction, the consumer transmits 
his unencrypted PAN as well as a static card verification value (either the 
CVV1 that is encoded on a magnetic stripe or the CVV2 digits written on the 
back of the card) to the merchant.24 The merchant then relays the PAN and 
verification code information to its acquirer and thence to the network and, 
ultimately, the issuer for authorization. If a fraudster were to intercept or steal 
unencrypted payment authorization data either from the consumer or from 
any of the parties in the transmission chain, the fraudster could use it to create 
counterfeit physical cards or in fraudulent card-not-present transactions. 
 
24 The precise terminology for the card verification value or card verification code varies by 
card network. For consistency, in this Article I refer to “CVV1” (static, magnetic stripe data), 
“CVV2” (static, back of card), and “CVV3” (dynamic, EMV-chip generated). 
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The Card Networks have encouraged adoption of security measures to 
address this fraud risk, although the particular measures encouraged have 
been questioned in terms of their effectiveness and distributional implications 
for participants in the payment systems. The two primary security responses 
to the risk of theft of payment data are (a) to reduce data retention by 
merchants and acquirers; and (b) to render payment data harder for thieves 
to use. Reducing data retention means that there is simply less payment 
authorization data sitting around for thieves to steal. Rendering data harder 
to use makes it less valuable and therefore less tempting to would-be thieves. 
a. PCI-DSS Mandated Encryption 
The mechanism for enforcing these security measures is the mandate of 
compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS). 
PCI-DSS is promulgated by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards 
Council, an entity created and controlled by American Express, Discover, JCB 
International, MasterCard, and Visa.25 The Card Networks require acquirer banks 
to ensure that merchants comply with PCI-DSS (and hold the acquirers liable for 
assessments upon noncompliance), so acquirers require merchants to attest 
compliance with PCI-DSS.26 
A recent update to the PCI-DSS restricts data retention, providing that 
“[t]he only cardholder data that may be stored after authorization is the primary 
account number or PAN (rendered unreadable), expiration date, cardholder 
name, and service code.”27 Under PCI-DSS, “sensitive authentication data,” 
such as card verification codes (the unembossed numbers on the back of cards), 
PIN numbers, and Full Track data (which contains all of the preceding data 
fields) may not be stored after authorization, even if encrypted.28 
PCI-DSS also requires that any data that is retained be rendered less valuable 
for thieves through various methods of obfuscating data. In particular, PCI-DSS 
requires that the PAN (but not the cardholder’s name, expiration date, or service 
 
25 For more on the PCI-DSS standard, see Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card 
Fraud Liability Rules, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 33-36 (2010). 
26 See, e.g., VISA CORE RULES AND VISA PRODUCT AND SERVICE RULES § 1.10.4.1 (2015) 
[hereinafter VISA CORE RULES], https://fronstream.zendesk.com/Inc/en-us/article_attachments/
204224066/Visa_Core_Rules_And_Visa_Product_and_Service_Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/45P9-ZGFG]. 
Historically the Card Networks have not required PCI-DSS compliance for smaller merchants. Since early 
2017, however, PCI-DSS applies to small merchants as well. See Small Merchant Security Program 
Requirements—UPDATE, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOM/download/merchants/bulletin-small-
merchant-security-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9XJ-KDBU] (citing small merchant breaches by hackers as 
justification for applying PCI-DSS compliance protocols to smaller merchants). 
27 PCI Security Standards Council, PCI-DSS 36 (Version 3.1 2015), https://www.
pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-1.pdf?agreement=true&time=1506890639322 
[https://perma.cc/WHM9-4MXE]. 
28 Id. at 37. 
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code) be rendered unreadable anywhere it is stored by encryption, hashing, or 
truncation methods.29 PCI-DSS also requires that sensitive information be 
encrypted for transmission over open, public networks, like the Internet.30 
Therefore, once a merchant receives cardholder data, the portion of that data that 
is deemed “sensitive authentication data” should never be stored post-authorization, 
PANs should always be stored in encrypted form, and all sensitive data should only 
be transmitted in encrypted form. While this is not quite the same as mandating 
end-to-end encryption of all data, it achieves something similar. 
PCI-DSS compliance is supposed to address the security vulnerability of 
cardholder data that a merchant has captured and retained, as well as the 
security vulnerabilities of transmission through open networks of cardholder 
data. Notably, however, PCI-DSS does not require that payment data be 
transmitted to the merchant in an encrypted form, unless it is transmitted 
over an open, public network like the Internet.31 Transmission over in-house, 
private networks may still be done “in the clear” (i.e., unencrypted).32 
b. EMV Chip Cards 
PCI-DSS relies on encryption as its primary security method. Encryption 
involves using a mathematical algorithm to scramble data in such a way that only 
someone who has the decoding key can read the data. Another distinct security 
technology is the integrated circuit cards, also known as Chip or EMV cards. Chip 
cards contain a microchip that is used with a special card reader to verify that the 
card is genuine.33 The communications channel in a chip card payment flows 
through the contact between the reader and the chip on the card. Chip cards, 
however, can also be “hybrid” cards capable of transmitting data via traditional 
magnetic stripe or NFC contactless technology, as well as through the chip. 
 
29 Id. at 40. 
30 Id. at 46-47. In addition to the Internet, PCI-DSS lists wireless technologies, cellular 
technologies, General Packet Radio Service, and satellite communications as a nonexhaustive list of 
open, public networks subject to encryption requirements. Id. 
31 The lack of initial encryption for magnetic stripe transactions has the effect of putting the 
cost of encryption on the merchant, rather than on the card issuer, but allows the merchant to 
continue to have access to the PAN, and thereby retain the PAN’s informational value for antifraud, 
advertising, loyalty, and customer service purposes. 
32 Notably, although PCI-DSS does not require encryption for transmission on internal 
networks, it does not define what would constitute such a network. Data transmitted internally 
would necessarily be stored, however, so there should be some level of encryption or truncation of 
the data under PCI-DSS Requirement 3.4. 
33 There is also an EMV contactless specification. See generally LERNER, supra note 2. It does 
not appear that any merchants in the United States currently accept EMV contactless transactions, 
meaning that all unauthorized transaction liability for transactions made using EMV contactless 
devices, such as ApplePay, is shifted to merchants. The lack of EMV contactless adoption appears 
to relate to the generally low rate of contactless acceptance in the United States and the certification 
costs of making contactless readers both EMV and PCI-DSS compliant. 
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When a Chip card is inserted in a Chip card reader, the microchip on the 
card generates a unique card verification code (CVV3) for each transaction 
based on a challenge-and-response interaction with the Chip card reader.34 The 
transaction-specific CVV3 and the PAN are transmitted to the merchant in the 
transaction and sent ultimately to the issuing bank, which then uses them to 
authorize (or decline) the transaction.35 The PAN and transaction-specific 
CVV3 are still transmitted in the clear from the Chip card to the merchant’s 
terminal. Because Chip cards transmit unencrypted payment data to the 
merchant, PCI-DSS–mandated encryption is the main bulwark of defense 
against theft of payment authorization data from merchants. 
It is often wrongly assumed that Chip technology prevents the creation of 
counterfeit cards. Although Chip technology makes it more difficult to counterfeit 
cards because the dynamic CVV3 on a Chip card can be used for only a single 
transaction, it does not prevent all counterfeit fraud.36 Creating a fully functional 
counterfeit Chip card for an account would not be cost-effective: the cost of 
cracking the security would exceed the credit limit on almost any account. But the 
effectiveness of Chip technology as a security measure is reduced by the lack of a 
universal adoption mandate, the coexistence of the magnetic stripe authorization 
channel, the lack of domain specificity for PAN data, and the varying levels of 
card data verification used by issuers. The existence of multiple authorization 
channels that use data that is largely non-specific to any particular channel enables 
fraudsters to arbitrage the differences in security measures for each channel. 
 
34 A hybrid card will still have a CVV1 encoded on the magnetic stripe and a CVV2 on the back of 
the card, but neither will be encoded on the chip or transmitted to the merchant in a Chip transaction. 
35 Alternatively, the transaction can be authorized in an offline transaction by the merchant’s 
EMV terminal, which matches a public encryption key against the private encryption key on the card. 
36 Of course, several other types of fraud remain possible with EMV. E.g., Ben Adida et al., Phish and 
Chips (Traditional and New Recipes for Attacking EMV), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/Phish-and-
Chips.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF67-JWQW] (explaining that data can be eavesdropped on from an EMV 
transaction, which can then be used to create a magnetic strip for fraudulent use in a foreign jurisdiction that 
does not support EMV); Ross Anderson & Mike Bond, The Man-in-the-Middle Defence, 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/Man-in-the-Middle-Defence.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS67-8VGZ] 
(describing how a middleman attack, whereby one merchant employs a relay device to monitor and forward 
chip and PIN information to an accomplice who is making another transaction, is not prevented by EMV 
technology); Black Hat, Crash and Pay: Owning and Cloning Payment Devices (2015), 
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Fillmore-Crash-Pay-How-To-Own-And-Clone-
Contactless-Payment-Devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ89-KPEG] (explaining the process of cloning EMV 
transactions in lieu of EMV cards); Mike Bond et al., Chip and Skim: Cloning EMV Cards with the Pre-Play 
Attack (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/unattack.pdf [https://perma.cc/LH7X-45BU] 
(noting that criminals have adapted to EMV technology in two ways: first by shifting to card-not-present 
transactions, and second, by cloning the magnetic strip of EMV cards); see also Thomas Fox-Brewster, See How 
This Android App Clones Contactless Credit Cards in Seconds, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2015, 12:05 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/02/18/android-app-clones-cards/6433ff82db39 
[https://perma.cc/VX8E-TT5E]; Peter Fillmore, Overview of Contactless Payment Cards (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Fillmore-Crash-Pay-How-To-Own-And-Clone-
Contactless-Payment-Devices-wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED6K-SWUF]. 
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For example, in a “milking” attack, a CVV3 and other authorization data 
could be lifted from a Chip card without a transaction being performed through 
a fake or altered terminal or RFID reader. That data could then be encoded on a 
magnetic stripe card and used at a non-Chip terminal or at a Chip terminal that 
reverts to a magnetic strip transaction when presented with a non-functional 
Chip card (a feature known as the “fallback function”).37 Indeed, it is even 
possible to encode the magnetic stripe such that the card appears to the reader 
to be “Chip-less,” and thus the reader will not instruct the consumer to insert 
the card into the Chip reader slot.38 While a diligent issuer should still catch such 
arbitrages based on differences in the service code for Chip and magnetic stripe 
transactions, issuers’ verification procedures are not standardized.39 
Moreover, even if a valid CVV3 cannot be captured, the PAN skimmed from 
a Chip card can be used in those card-not-present transactions that do not 
require a CVV2 because there is no domain specificity for PAN.40 Thus one 
likely effect of the adoption of Chip technology will be the migration of fraud 
(or at least fraud attempts) from card-present transactions to card-not-present 
transactions, as well as to card-present merchants that do not accept Chip 
transactions.41 So a more accurate statement of Chip technology’s effect is 
that while it makes it not cost-effective to counterfeit a fully functional Chip 
card, it does not prevent all forms of counterfeiting because Chip card data 
can be used for magnetic stripe and card-not-present transactions. 
All Chip cards and readers are made to conform to specifications from 
EMVCo, LLC. EMV is an acronym for the names of the venture’s original 
partners: Europay International, MasterCard International, and Visa 
International. The current members of EMVCo are American Express, 
 
37 See EMV Migration Forum, Understanding the 2015 U.S. Fraud Liability Shifts 2 (May 2015), 
https://signapay.com/images/resources/understanding_the_2015_us_liability_fraud_shifts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2HS-978F]. For more on fallback functionality, see AMERICAN EXPRESS, 
IMPLEMENTING AMERICAN EXPRESS EMV™ ACCEPTANCE ON A TERMINAL § 4.1.1 (2007), 
https://www209.americanexpress.com/merchant/singlevoice/pdfs/chipnpin/EMV_Terminal%20
Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQW6-C7FH], and VISA, TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE 
GUIDE § 3.2.2 (2015) [hereinafter VISA TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE GUIDE], 
http://technologypartner.visa.com/download.aspx?id=32 [https://perma.cc/HJ8Q-FAZZ]. 
38 See New Chip Card Security Flaw Found, PYMNTS.COM (Aug. 4, 2016), https://
www.pymnts.com/news/retail/2016/new-emv-security-flaw-found/ [https://perma.cc/T53Z-PD2A]. 
39 Id. 
40 A notable exception is American Express, which does appear to have domain-specific tokenization. 
See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): American Express Token Service, AM. EXPRESS (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter 
American Express Token Service], https://network.americanexpress.com/globalnetwork/dam/jcr:480cdd06-
048e-48a4-9b21-c65a18df2370/Token-Service-FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5FG-GT5F]. 
41 This was the experience with EMV adoption in the UK. See Bond et al., supra note 36, at 3. 
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JCB, Discover, MasterCard (which purchased Europay), UnionPay, and 
Visa—significantly, not the U.S. PIN-debit networks or ACH operators.42 
The use of Chip cards and readers is not mandated in the United States, 
but it is encouraged by a change in the Card Networks’ rules regarding liability 
for unauthorized transactions. In the United States, as of October 2015, 
American Express, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa (but not the PIN-debit 
networks, because they are not co-owners of EMVCo) instituted a change in 
their rules that allocate liability for unauthorized card-present transactions. 
Historically, for card-present transactions (which include contactless 
transactions), the card issuer was liable for unauthorized transactions provided 
that the merchant followed the requisite security procedures.43 Otherwise the 
acquirer would be liable for the unauthorized transaction, but would 
contractually transfer the liability to the merchant. In contrast, merchants have 
always been liable for all unauthorized transactions in card-not-present 
situations, although they can, by contract, shift the liability to other parties, 
such as the Card Networks, for card-not-present authentication services. 
Under the revised rules, called the “EMV liability shift,” if a consumer 
presents a Chip card in a card-present situation, liability for counterfeit card 
transactions shifts to the acquirer (and thence to the merchant) unless the 
merchant properly uses a Chip card reader, in which case the liability shifts back 
to the issuer.44 The old rule that issuers are liable for counterfeit card-present 
transactions remains in place if the card presented is not a Chip card, as well as 
for unauthorized transactions not involving counterfeit cards.45 By issuing EMV 
cards, issuers are thus able to shift the fraud risk for counterfeit cards to 
merchants. Although EMV cards cost more to issue than traditional magnetic 
stripe-only cards, most issuers appear to have determined that the savings from 
 
42 See Overview of EMVCo, EMVCO, https://www.emvco.com/about/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/MGBQ7-7359]. 
43 See Levitin, supra note 25, at 15. 
44 See MASTERCARD, CHARGEBACK GUIDE § 3.5 (2014), https://www.mastercardadvisors.com/
content/dam/advisors/en-us/documents/ChargebackGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE4W-PXV3]; VISA 
CORE RULES, note 26, §§ 4.1.22.56, 5.9.2.5. 
45 VISA CORE RULES, supra note 26, § 4.1.22.57. ATMs and automatic fuel dispensers are also 
not covered by the October 2015 liability shift. In order to avoid the liability shift, a merchant must 
properly use terminals that are certified as EMV-compliant. The EMV-certification process is by device 
type for each acquirer, and any kernel change in a device from a reprogramming, such as adding a new 
implementation allowing the terminal to accept PayPal, requires a new certification. The certification 
process has significant costs, and it is unclear how long an EMV certification remains valid absent a 
merchant’s reprogramming of a device. Moreover, the initial transition to EMV has been slowed because 
the certification capacity is insufficient for the demand, resulting in a certification backlog. As a result, 
many merchants with EMV-capable terminals have not activated the EMV capability since it will not 
result in avoidance of the liability shift and will only result in slower transactions at point-of-sale. 
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the liability rule shift outweigh the issuance cost, especially when reissuance is 
done as part of the normal card replacement cycle.46 
Despite the EMV liability shift, magnetic stripe technology is still widely used 
in the United States, even though it will presumably be phased out at some point 
in the future.47 For the time being, however, the Chip and magnetic stripe 
technologies operate side-by-side. Many cardholders still have magnetic 
stripe–only cards. Issuers are replacing magnetic stripe–only cards with 
hybrid cards that can be used for both magnetic stripe and Chip transactions, 
but the replacement appears to be part of the normal card replacement cycle. 
Even with hybrid cards, however, many merchants have not installed or 
activated EMV card readers because of the high cost of the equipment and 
the subsequent PCI-DSS and EMV-compliance certifications, relative to the 
merchant’s own antifraud benefits.48 
Another reason for limited adoption of Chip acceptance is that part of the 
benefit from a merchant’s use of Chip technology is the protection it provides 
to other merchants by reducing the likelihood that a data breach at the merchant 
will be used for fraud at those other merchants. In this regard, adoption of Chip 
technology is analogous to vaccination, in that it not only protects the 
vaccinated individual, but it creates positive externalities for other unvaccinated 
individuals in that the vaccinated individual cannot infect them. Merchants, 
however, are unlikely to account for this positive externality when making their 
decisions about accepting Chip transactions, and neither merchants nor issuers 
are mandated to use Chip technology. The lack of universal adoption combined 
with the continued use of magnetic stripe technology undercuts the potential 
effectiveness of Chip technology by creating opportunities to arbitrage security 
measures between authorization channels. Still, as Chip transactions become 
more common, fraudsters are likely to concentrate their attention on merchants 
 
46 Cf. How Much Will EMV Really Cost Issuers?, PYMTS.COM (Sept. 3, 2014), 
https://www.pymnts.com/news/2014/how-much-will-emv-really-cost-issuers/ [https://perma.cc/
PKW29ZAP]. 
47 See VISA TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE GUIDE, supra note 37 (noting that “Visa is currently 
evaluating time frames under which to establish a sunset date” for magnetic stripe technology); EMV 
Contactless Acceptance Requirements, VISA BUS. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015), https://
www.visa.com/chip/merchants/grow-your-business/payment-technologies/credit-card-chip/webinar/
resources/webcast7/story_content/external-files/A104336.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E95-UEVE] (describing the 
industry shift towards chip technology and announcing future compliance deadlines). As merchants shift to 
EMV technology, though, it is not clear how the cause of fraud (including counterfeit, lost card, stolen card, 
fraudulent card application, and account takeover) will be determined. This raises the risk that merchants 
invest in the technology to become EMV compliant, but do not in fact avoid liability if the fraud is classified 
as due to something other than a counterfeit card. 
48 See Ian Kar, The Chip Card Transition in the U.S. has Been a Disaster, QUARTZ (July 29, 2016), 
https://qz.com/717876/the-chip-card-transition-in-the-us-has-been-a-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/
X9N7-952L]. 
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that do not accept Chip transactions, thereby increasing the value to merchants 
of accepting Chip transactions. 
The adoption of Chip technology does not affect merchants’ ability to use 
PANs for antifraud, customer loyalty, advertising, and returns. Although the 
card verification code on a Chip transaction is dynamic, the cardholder’s PAN 
is not, and is unencrypted when transmitted to the merchant.49 This means that 
with Chip transactions, the merchant can correlate different transactions made 
with the same PAN, which facilitates antifraud, customer loyalty, and returns. 
Digital wallets can, but need not perform Chip transactions. Some mobile 
wallets like ApplePay use a chip in the mobile device as the EMV chip for 
card present transactions, where the consumer is face-to-face with the 
merchants. The ability for a mobile wallet to do a Chip transaction, however, 
depends on the communications channel used by the wallet; web-based 
wallets, for example, cannot do Chip transactions. 
c. Tokenization 
Another security measure is “tokenization”: the replacement of payment 
card data—the PAN and the card verification code—with randomly 
generated substitute data known as a “token.” The token looks like a PAN and 
card verification code in that it contains the same number of digits, but it is 
in fact a random number that does not match any actual PAN, so it cannot 
itself be used for a subsequent transaction. 
Unlike encryption, tokenization does not scramble data using algorithmic 
transformations. Instead, tokenization replaces the original data with 
randomly generated substitute data. The match between the random token 
value and the original data is recorded in a secure codebook (called a “vault”) 
retained by the issuer. Tokenization, according to Visa’s CEO, is “the single 
biggest change that’s been made in the payment networks easily over the past 
15 or 20 years and maybe longer.”50 
Tokenization is not a necessary feature of digital wallets, but it appears to 
be an increasingly standard security measure. By the same token, tokenization 
is not specific to digital wallets; it can be used by a merchant for any 
transaction as part of a layered security approach. For example, a merchant 
can transmit encrypted payment data to its acquirer. The acquirer will 
forward the encrypted PAN and card verification code to the Card Network 
and the issuer for authorization, but will itself (or through a vendor) tokenize 
the data and return only a token to the merchant. The merchant will retain 
 
49 See supra Section I.A. 
50 VISA CEO Confirms Tokens as New Network Revenue Stream, PYMNTS.COM (Nov. 13, 2014), 
https://www.pymnts.com/2014/visa-ceo-confirms-tokens-as-new-network-revenue-stream/ [https://
perma.cc/NB2F-RRFW]. 
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the tokenized data, rather than the original encrypted PAN and card 
verification code. This tokenized data is useless not only to the hackers, but 
also to the merchant.51 Digital wallets potentially mask PANs by facilitating 
data “tokenization” before the data is even transmitted to the merchant. 
It is possible, however, to use a “multipay” token that is unique to both a 
PAN and a merchant.52 A multipay token is essentially a merchant-specific 
ersatz PAN. Such a multipay token can be used for subsequent transactions, 
including refunds and credits, but only at a single merchant. This is a solution 
that is often deployed by eCommerce merchants that store payment 
information in online digital wallets. After the initial transaction, the token 
will be linked with a description such as the card brand and the last four digits 
of a PAN. When the consumer selects the card with that particular description, 
the merchant will transmit the corresponding token to the acquirer, which will 
decode the token and transmit the original PAN and card verification code to 
the issuer for authorization. Digital wallets offered by eCommerce merchants 
thus frequently use multipay tokenization.53 A multipay token also enables 
merchants to track a consumer’s transactions for antifraud purposes, and—if 
the merchant can correlate customer address or other identification 
information with the token—advertising and loyalty program purposes.54 
Tokenization is also used by offline digital wallets. The particular application of 
tokenization varies by digital wallet, but its use in the ApplePay digital wallet is 
instructive. When a consumer loads a card on the ApplePay digital wallet, the 
consumer first enters her card information in the ApplePay application on an iOS 
device. When the consumer does so, the iOS device communicates with Apple, 
indicating from which bank Apple should request a token and card verification code 
algorithm. In response to a request from Apple, the bank transmits the token and 
card verification code algorithm to Apple, which then re-transmits the token and 
card verification code algorithm to the iOS device. The token and card verification 
code algorithm are then stored by the iOS device on a special, dedicated microchip 
known as a “secure element” that cannot be accessed by iOS applications other than 
 
51 This sort of acquirer tokenization does not eliminate data breach risk, but instead transfers 
it from the merchant to the acquirer, a sensible move only to the extent that acquirers maintain 
better security measures than merchants. 
52 See generally FIRST DATA, HOW MULTIPAY TOKENS CAN REDUCE SECURITY RISKS AND THE 
PCI COMPLIANCE BURDEN FOR ECOMMERCE MERCHANTS (2012), https://www.firstdata.com/
downloads/thought-leadership/MultipayTokensWP.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2JS-UDSF]. 
53 Multipay tokenization can even be done with a Chip card as long as the initial Chip card 
verification was done offline. 
54 A multipay token does, however, create the risk of “on-us” fraud following a data breach 
using the multipay token at the merchant. 
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ApplePay. Only the token and the card verification code algorithm are stored on 
the iOS device; the cardholder’s PAN is not stored on the iOS device.55 
When a consumer authorizes a transaction—for example, through a 
fingerprint scan or entry of a PIN in ApplePay, the secure element is 
prompted to take the token and encrypt it using the card verification code 
algorithm. Although the token is itself static, the card verification code 
algorithm uses it to produce a unique cryptogram for every transaction, just 
as with a regular “Chip” card. ApplePay transmits the encrypted token to the 
merchant either through NFC or through a web browser.56 
Tokenization plus encryption means that there are effectively two levels of data 
obfuscation between the cardholder’s PAN and the cryptogram that is transmitted 
to the merchant. The cryptogram received by the merchant is an encrypted token, 
with an algorithmic relationship between the cryptogram and the unencrypted 
token, and a random relationship between the token and the PAN. 
After ApplePay transmits the cryptogram to the merchant, the merchant 
(through its acquirer) retransmits it to the payment card network. The network 
will apply the card verification code algorithm to unencrypt the cryptogram, 
which, if the cryptogram is authentic, will produce the token. If the cryptogram 
is authentic, then the network will pass the unencrypted token along to the 
issuer, which will decode the token, producing the PAN of the cardholder 
attempting the transaction. Once the issuer determines that the token is 
authentic and that a transaction is authorized for the associated account, the 
issuer will authorize the transaction. All of this takes place in a matter of seconds. 
The basic mechanics of a tokenized transaction are similar to that of a regular 
magnetic stripe or Chip card transaction, but in a tokenized transaction, the 
merchant never sees the cardholder’s PAN. Instead, the merchant has access to 
only a dynamically encrypted token. Thus, the merchant is not able to track 
transactions from the same consumer, frustrating antifraud measures, 
advertising and customer loyalty programs, and potentially even returns. Figure 
3 shows how a token-generating digital wallet fits in a payment card network. 
 
 
55 Access to the secure element is controlled by either the device manufacturer (Apple) or the mobile 
carrier (Android devices), which allows exclusion from the secure element of applications not approved by 
the device manufacturer or mobile carrier. On Android devices, however, a technology called Host Card 
Emulation enables use of a cloud-based secure element, thereby opening up the device to any application’s 
use of a secure element. See E.J. House, Tokenization a Critical Security Technology for Apple Pay and Other 
Mobile Payments, 3 DELTA SYS. (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.3dsi.com/blog/tokenization-a-critical-security-
technology-for-apple-pay-and-other-mobile-payments/ [https://perma.cc/7SCS-M9BV]. 
56 Id. 
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Figure 3: Payment Card Transaction with Token-Generating  
Digital Wallet 
 
3. The Economics of Payment Card Transactions 
a. Fees 
Digital wallets may also affect the economics of payment card transactions 
because they represent another mouth to feed in the transactional ecosystem. 
Services such as tokenization are not free. The parties that provide the digital wallet 
expect to be compensated, and their compensation will either come out of the 
pockets of acquirers, issuers, and the payment card networks, or will be passed on 
to merchants or to consumers. For example, on every ApplePay transaction, the 
card issuer reportedly pays Apple fifteen basis points (0.15%) on the transaction 
volume.57 Those fifteen basis points eat into the issuer’s bottom line. As the volume 
of ApplePay transactions increases, issuers will surely look to recoup those fifteen 
 
57 See Jim Daly, Apple Pay: No Charge for Merchants, But Transaction-Security Fees for Issuers, 
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/apple-pay-no-charge-
for-merchants-but-transaction-security-fees-for-issuers [https://perma.cc/GN6V-LF2B] (noting 
Apple justifies the fee as a guarantee of the validity of the transaction). 
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basis points elsewhere. Similarly, the Card Networks themselves have indicated 
that they see digital wallets as a potential revenue source.58 
To the extent issuers or networks have increased expenses or seek to increase 
their own revenue, the result will likely be higher costs for acquirers. Demand for 
network services appears to be greater for acquirers (and thus merchants) than for 
issuers (and thus consumers) given that fees currently flow from acquirers to issuers 
in almost all payment card systems. Therefore, it seems likely that the costs of 
digital wallets will fall on acquirers in the first instance. To the extent that the costs 
of digital wallets fall on acquirers, the acquirers will, in turn, likely pass along the 
increased costs to merchants in the merchant discount fee, which is often structured 
as an express pass-through of the fees paid by the acquirer plus an additional 
mark-up percentage. Figures 4 and 5 show the fee structure for a traditional 
payment card transaction and for a digital wallet transaction. 
 
Figure 4: Traditional Payment Card Transaction Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
58 See VISA CEO Confirms Tokens as New Network Revenue Stream, supra note 50 (noting that 
although Visa waived tokenization fees for 2015, the company retained the ability to make “decisions 
on who you want to give access to, whether you want to charge for it and things like that”). 
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Figure 5: Payment Card Transaction Economics with Digital Wallets 
 
b. Monetizable Data 
Digital wallets affect payment card economics in ways beyond fees. They also 
affect the flow of data in payment card transactions. Consumer data is a hugely 
valuable byproduct of payment transactions. It can be analyzed for marketing 
purposes, as payment data tells what a consumer has been interested in purchasing 
and what they are willing to pay for it. This data can be utilized by a wide range of 
merchants, including those that generate the data, their competitors, and even 
merchants in other sectors, including financial institutions. Yet if general consumer 
information is digital gold, payment information is digital platinum: it is 
information about how consumers actually spend, and past spending is often 
indicative of future spending. It is data already linked with monetization. 
In a traditional plastic card transaction, most of the valuable consumer 
data—what particular items were purchased and at what price—is retained by 
the merchant and not shared with the Card Network or issuer bank. Instead, 
the financial institutions involved in the transaction see only an aggregate 
level of spending, the name of the merchant, and a general category label for 
the merchant. Absent a merchant’s agreement, they cannot see item-level data 
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(also known as stock-keeping unit (SKU)–level data or Level 3 data).59 
Digital wallets can potentially reallocate that valuable data from the merchant 
to either the Card Network or the issuer. The ability of digital wallets to 
reallocate data is discussed in more detail in subsection II.B.2.a. 
II. BENEFITS AND RISKS OF DIGITAL WALLETS 
Digital wallets affect consumers and merchants quite differently. As we 
have seen, different digital wallets entail different form factors, technologies, 
and business models. Different digital wallets collect and transmit different 
data through different “pipelines.” Accordingly, there are different risks 
involved with different digital wallets. 
For consumers, different wallets present different profiles in terms of 
privacy and data security and—mirroring the credit/debit card 
distinction—different legal regimes for term disclosure, unauthorized 
transaction liability, and error resolution. For merchants, different wallets 
present different risks in terms of competitive impact and control over customer 
data, customer relationship management, control over tender choice and 
payment routing, fraud, data security, intellectual property liability, and cost.60 
The differences matter to consumers, but not nearly as much as they do 
to merchants because of the differences in the underlying legal regimes. The 
consumer-to-merchant leg of the payment transaction is governed by a robust 
set of federal statutes and regulations. To the extent that existing public law 
for credit and debit card transactions carries over to digital wallets, as it 
presumably does and should, digital wallets have a more limited impact on 
consumers’ legal rights. 
In contrast, the merchant-to–payment system leg of the transaction is 
almost entirely governed through private ordering.61 Merchants have only two 
protections against assumption of unwanted risks from digital wallets: they can 
simply refuse to accept digital wallets; or second, they can attempt to shift risks 
through contracts, whether through risk allocation with counterparties or 
 
59 See Visa’s Next Big Business: Tokens and Data, PYMNTS.COM (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2014/visas-next-big-business-tokens-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/3PNF-
56KF] (explaining that although Visa’s “network has the capability to capture SKU-level data and add that to 
the series of data and analytics services we can provide . . . . you would have to have an individual agreement 
with that merchant to capture that SKU-level data”); see also Level 3 Processing, BLUEPAY, https://
www.bluepay.com/payment-processing/gateway/level-3/ [https://perma.cc/DD7J-E5UM] (contrasting the 
standard “level one” card data providing limited purchase data with “level three” data providing information 
akin to an “itemized invoice”). 
60 See supra note 1. 
61 The sole exception is the Durbin Interchange Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2 (2012), 
which places a cap on debit card swipe fees and requires multihoming for debit cards to encourage 
price competition for routing below the cap. 
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insurance. Neither of these protections is particularly effective, because, as 
subsection II.B.3 explains, the Card Networks’ “Honor All Wallets” rules 
largely deprive merchants of their ability to refuse or condition acceptance of 
digital wallets. 
A. Consumer Benefits and Risks 
1. Consumer Benefits from Digital Wallets 
Digital wallets hold out important benefits to consumers: faster and more 
convenient payments; improved recordkeeping; the integration of payments with 
loyalty and rewards programs; and helpful, targeted advertising and promotions. 
Digital wallet payments can potentially be faster than traditional card 
payment. In particular, for EMV transactions, digital wallet payments made 
via NFC are faster than those made with a chip card using an EMV terminal.62 
Digital wallets can also help consumers with their recordkeeping and 
accounting. By storing a record of consumer transactions, digital wallets can 
facilitate consumer returns, exchanges, and reimbursements, as well as assist with 
taxkeeping and personal financial planning. Paper receipts are bulky, require 
organization, and are easy to lose. A digital wallet can keep all of a consumer’s 
receipts in one place, permit search and sorting, and takes up no additional space. 
Digital wallets can also provide data transfers to other software applications, such 
as personal finance applications like Quicken, that can be used for keeping track 
of a consumer’s finances both generally and specifically for tax preparation. 
Convenience (and coolness) is also a benefit for consumers. Rather than a 
bulky wallet full of store loyalty cards or a key chain covered with miniature reward 
program tags, a digital wallet can store information for multiple rewards and 
loyalty programs without taking up any more physical space. And although 
separate physical rewards and loyalty cards are easy to forget to use, a digital wallet 
can automatically apply rewards and loyalty programs with payment. Another 
convenience is that some digital wallet apps allow a customer to “order ahead” so 
that the order is ready when the customer arrives at the merchant’s store. 
Digital wallets also facilitate targeted promotions and advertising, which 
can benefit consumers. These promotions can be integrated with payments so 
that they are automatically applied when transacting, and targeted advertising 
can help consumers find products they might be interested in. Likewise, 
consumers can benefit from advertising and promotions because merchants 
are able to focus their promotions on the consumers most likely to use their 
products and to tailor their promotions toward those consumers’ interests. 
 
62 See Chen, supra note 19. 
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2. Consumer Risks from Digital Wallets 
Digital wallets are not without risks for consumers. Though many of the 
risks apply generally to all payment systems, this subsection highlights 
additional risks specific to digital wallets. 
a. Varying Legal Regimes 
One of the risks related to digital wallets is the possibility of a shift in the 
governing legal regime. Different payment methods are subject to different legal 
regimes—the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z thereunder 
govern credit cards,63 the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and Regulation 
E thereunder govern debit cards,64 and ACH transactions are governed by the 
private rules of the National Automated Clearinghouse Association 
(NACHA)65 and potentially EFTA/Regulation E, depending on the particular 
transactional details.66 These statutes and regulations provide a legal framework 
for disclosure requirements, liability for unauthorized transactions, and 
resolution of errors and system malfunctions. The TILA/Regulation Z rules for 
credit cards vary somewhat from the EFTA/Regulation E rules for debit cards 
and NACHA Rules. For example, consumers’ unauthorized transaction liability 
for credit cards is capped at $50;67 for debit cards it varies between $50, $500, and 
unlimited liability, depending on the consumer’s negligence;68 and under 
NACHA rules there is no consumer liability for unauthorized transactions.69 
Presumably, the application of TILA/Regulation Z or EFTA/Regulation E 
does not change based on the form factor of the payment device used, at least for 
pass-through wallets like ApplePay, where the digital device merely substitutes 
 
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1665 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2017). TILA/Regulation Z may well also 
apply to mobile carrier billing for third party charges, which operates much like a charge card 
account. See generally MARK E. BUDNITZ, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF MOBILE PAYMENTS 
(2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/02/legal_framework_of_mobile_payments_
white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8H2Y-VX5L]. 
64 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1005 (2017). General purpose, reloadable 
prepaid cards do not clearly fall within this legal regime, but are subject to a rulemaking by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that recently went into effect in October 2017. See Prepaid 
Accounts Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 81 Fed. Reg. 83,934 (Nov. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1005 and 1026). 
65 See Introduction to NACHA, 2013 NACHA OPERATING RULES & GUIDELINES (2013). NACHA is 
a nonprofit association that serves as the ACH Network administrator. See About NACHA—The Electronic 
Payments Association, NACHA (2017), https://www.nacha.org/about [https://perma.cc/T9R7-YJWD]. 
66 See, e.g., CFPB, SUPPLEMENT I TO 12 C.F.R. § 1005, at § 3(b)(1)(1)(i) (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/eregulations/1005-Subpart-A-Interp/2016-24506#1005-3-b-1-Interp-1 
[https://perma.cc/CDV6-49DA] (noting that ACH transfers by financial institutions to consumers are 
governed by Regulation E). 
67 § 1643(a)(1)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.12(b)(1)(ii) (2017). 
68 § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 1005.6(b) (2017). 
69 NACHA, supra note 65, § 3.11. 
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for the plastic card. TILA defines credit card as “any card, plate, coupon book or 
other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, property, labor, 
or services on credit.”70 Thus, as the Fourth Circuit has observed, the “core 
element of a ‘credit card’ is the account number, not the piece of plastic.”71 
Similarly, while the application of EFTA is keyed to the use of an “accepted 
card or other means of access,” and Regulation E is keyed to the use of an 
“access device,”72 the two have identical definitions: “a card, code, or other 
means of access to a consumer’s account.”73 The official CFPB interpretation 
of “access device” includes “debit cards, personal identification numbers 
(PINs), telephone transfer and telephone bill payment codes, and other means 
that may be used by a consumer to initiate an electronic fund transfer.”74 
While it would appear from these observations that TILA/Regulation Z 
and EFTA/Regulation E apply to digital wallets depending on the funding 
source of the payment, there is no case law yet on that point. Digital wallets 
do not affect the application of NACHA Rules because ACH is not a 
device-specific payment system. 
And even if these legal rules do not change for pass-through wallets, they can 
still be a source of consumer confusion because a digital wallet might default a 
consumer’s payment choice to a particular payment method, thereby selecting an 
applicable legal regime without the consumer realizing. For example, if a digital 
wallet contains both credit and debit cards, but the digital wallet defaults to the 
debit card, the consumer’s liability for unauthorized transactions increases, even 
though the consumer may not have deliberately selected a debit card in the same 
way as when the consumer chooses which card to take out of a physical wallet. 
There is no possibility of default payment selection with physical wallets. 
Staged wallets (such as PayPal) present an additional source of confusion 
in terms of the applicable legal regime. Recall that in a staged wallet there are 
two coupled transactions: a funding transaction and a payment transaction. 
The different stages of the transaction may well be subject to different legal 
regimes, something consumers are unlikely to know or understand. Suppose 
that the funding for a staged wallet transaction is from a debit card, while the 
payment transaction is through ACH. The funding transaction would be 
subject to EFTA/Regulation E. The payment transaction, however, would 
most likely to be subject to NACHA Rules. 
The point here is that there may be some shift or confusion about which 
legal regime applies, and depending on the particular design of a digital wallet, 
 
70 § 1602(k). 
71 United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086, 1092 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that the use of a credit 
card account number over telephone qualifies as a “credit card” for TILA criminal fraud liability). 
72 § 1005.6. 
73 12 U.S.C. § 1693a(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1005.2(a)(1) (2017). 
74 See CFPB, supra note 66, § 1005.2(a)(1). 
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there may also be a transformation in the applicable legal regime, which can 
impact consumers’ rights in terms of disclosure requirements, unauthorized 
transaction liability, and error resolution. Consumers may well be unaware of 
these issues, and this bespeaks a need to consider greater uniformity in the 
regulation of different types of consumer payment systems, as well as a need 
to give consumers clear control over their default choice of payment source. 
b. Security Measures and Fraud Risk 
Digital wallets vary in terms of security measures: the consumer action 
needed to authorize the transaction, the sort of data stored, the sort of 
encryption or tokenization used, the applications that can access the 
consumer’s data, and the ability to remotely disable or “wipe” the device with 
a “kill” switch. Moreover, some wallets are more easily hacked than others. 
As a result, there are different fraud risk profiles for different devices. 
Consumers’ direct pecuniary exposure to fraud risk is limited, however, 
for traditional plastic credit and debit cards, and as noted in the previous 
subsection, those same legal regimes would seemingly apply to credit and 
debit payments via digital wallet. There are, however, important indirect 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs for consumers when dealing with fraud, 
such as the hassle involved of notifying card issuers, getting cards reissued, 
and resetting automatic bill payments.75 Thus there are still fraud risks to 
consumers from digital wallets. Indeed, to the extent that digital wallets store 
other consumer information, the impact of fraud can be greater—a fraudster 
might not only access the consumer’s funds, but adding insult to injury, he 
might use the consumer’s coupons, too. 
Even within a particular digital wallet, there are security differences based 
on the type of payment made: for instance, a credit card or signature-debit card 
versus a PIN-debit card. Debit cards are legally required to “multihome,” 
meaning being capable of processing transactions on more than one unaffiliated 
network.76 Whether the consumer is defaulted by the Application Identifier 
(AID)—software on the merchant’s point-of-sale terminal—to using a 
particular network (and thus a particular authorization technology), and 
whether the consumer understands the choice involved, both have implications 
for the fraud risk, because there is a much greater fraud risk for single-factor, 
authenticated signature-debit payments than for two-factor, authenticated 
PIN-debit payments. It is much easier for fraudsters to copy a card’s magnetic 
strip than to copy a PIN and the one-time data from a chip, for example. 
 
75 See Levitin, supra note 25, at 42. 
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1) (2012) (describing how a credit card issuer or card network cannot 
restrict the number of payment card networks on which electronic debit transactions may be processed). 
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The number of parties involved in digital wallet transactions might 
exacerbate fraud problems for consumers due to confusion about the proper 
party to contact when fraud is suspected. Consumers have little ability to 
sensibly evaluate the security measures on different devices so they cannot 
protect their interests with any type of security measure;77 their main protection 
is the federal limits on direct pecuniary liability for unauthorized transactions.78 
c. Error Resolution 
An important part of the federal regulation of credit and debit cards are 
the regimes for addressing error resolution. Card issuers are obligated to 
investigate consumer claims of error in a timely fashion,79 and consumers can 
withhold payment while such investigation is pending.80 
With a traditional plastic card, it is very clear who the consumer should contact 
regarding an error. With a digital wallet, it is less clear. For example, would a 
consumer who had an error claim from a Chase Visa transaction using ApplePay 
know to contact Chase directly, rather than ApplePay or Visa? The problem is not 
the transformation of error resolution rights, but rather confusion in contacting 
the proper party. This confusion can result in delay (which changes legal liability 
regarding unauthorized debit card transactions81) or the consumer simply giving 
up, effectively depriving the consumer of her error resolution rights. 
d. Wallet Provider Insolvency 
Staged digital wallets such as PayPal, Venmo, and Google Pay allow 
consumers to maintain balances in their respective digital accounts. The funds in 
these accounts are not FDIC-insured; they are simply unsecured claims against 
the wallet-provider.82 Thus in the event of PayPal, Venmo, or Google Pay’s 
bankruptcy, there may be no recovery for consumers with account balances. 
 
77 A recent enforcement action by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has underscored 
this and the need for digital wallet providers to be accurate in their claims about security. See Dwolla, 
Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007. 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
79 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1005.11(b)–(c) (2017). 
80 See id. at (c)(2) (listing the conditions for the provisional crediting of consumer’s account 
for debit card transactions); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.13(d)(1) (2017) (listing the conditions when consumers 
can justifiably withhold payments for credit card transactions). 
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)(2) (2012). 
82 See, e.g., GOOGLE PAYMENTS, TERMS OF SERVICE 13 (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://payments.google.com/payments/apis-secure/get_legal_document?ldo=0&ldt=buyertos&
ldr=US [https://perma.cc/95CZ-ADXJ] (“Funds held by GPC or its service providers (including 
any bank service providers) in connection with the processing of Payment Transactions are not 
deposit obligations of Buyer and are not insured for the benefit of Buyer by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation or any other governmental agency.”); PAYPAL USER AGREEMENT 3 (July 
27, 2017), https://www.paypalobjects.com/webstatic/ua/pdf/US/en_US/ua.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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Wallet-provider insolvency presents a risk with pass-through wallets as 
well. Even if the wallet provider does not hold funds for the consumer, it still 
holds consumer data.83 If a wallet provider were to become insolvent and 
cease operations, consumers would be cut off from any data stored in the 
cloud. This could include receipts for purchases and transaction histories, 
which would frustrate consumer attempts at product returns or accounting. 
e. Loss of Privacy 
Perhaps the most important difference in risks for consumers between 
traditional plastic cards and digital wallets is privacy. A consumer’s spending 
habits are extremely revealing, conveying information about a consumer’s 
interests and problems. As a saying often attributed to Martin Luther goes, 
“Show me where a man spends his time and money, and I’ll show you his 
god.”84 Unsurprisingly, then, survey data indicates that privacy concerns are 
quite salient for consumers with mobile wallets.85 
Traditional plastic cards do not offer the high level of anonymity of cash 
transactions. Nonetheless, they offer a reasonable degree of privacy insofar as they 
do not enable other parties to see the entire picture of a consumer’s transacting 
behavior. A transaction with a traditional plastic card transmits only data about 
that particular transaction undertaken with that particular card. It does not 
transmit data about other transactions on that card or other cards, much less about 
the consumer’s other behavior, such as the consumer’s web browsing history. 
A merchant to whom a traditional plastic card payment is made receives 
substantial information about that particular transaction. The merchant will know 
exactly what the consumer purchased (known as the “stock keeping unit” 
(SKU), or Level 3 data), for what price, and when.86 But the merchant is limited 
in its ability to aggregate information from multiple transactions. At most, the 
merchant can aggregate other transactions the consumer has made using that 
particular card with that particular merchant. The merchant has no visibility into 
the consumer’s other transactions at other merchants or using other payment 
 
32CW-RUTK] (“Any PayPal balance you hold represents an unsecured claim against PayPal and is 
not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”). 
83 See, e.g., PAYPAL, PRIVACY POLICY FOR PAYPAL SERVICES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://
www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/privacy-full [https://perma.cc/59H5-ERPZ] (noting how PayPal 
collects data from consumers through webpages they access, geolocation, and web cookies). 
84 E.g., Martin Luther, AZ QUOTES, http://www.azquotes.com/quote/798806 [https://
perma.cc/DNU7-ZR99]. 
85 See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE ET AL., MOBILE PAYMENTS (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_comments/2013/12/00007-89102.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ3H-SYCN] (describing how 
Americans overwhelmingly would reject any system that would track their purchases or share personal 
information with merchants). 
86 Id. at 5-6 (noting how merchants receive significant data from card transactions but also that 
merchants cannot uniquely identify their customers). 
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cards, and the merchant will have no window into the consumer’s payment history 
and account balances. And if the merchant is a brick-and-mortar retailer, it will 
also not have any visibility into consumers’ web browsing and search history. 
Conversely, with traditional plastic cards, financial institutions have much 
greater ability to aggregate information from transactions made at multiple 
merchants, even on multiple cards. But that information is still much more 
limited than what is available to merchants. With traditional plastic card 
transactions, neither the Card Network nor the consumer’s bank ever sees the 
SKU data.87 Instead, these institutions can identify the various merchants 
used by the consumer by whatever name the merchant uses; the merchant’s 
industry by broad category (e.g., “Hardware Equipment and Supplies” or 
“Supermarkets”);88 and the manner in which the transaction was authorized 
(card-present or card-not-present), which provides some information about 
the consumer’s past location. 
To be sure, merchant category data can, in some cases, be quite revealing. 
Consider categories such as “Wig and Toupee Stores,” “Massage Parlors,” 
“Counseling Services—Debt, Marriage, Personal,” or “Bail and Bond 
Payments.”89 One does not need to know the specific services purchased to 
get an impression of the consumer; some credit card issuers allegedly have 
used such information in their pricing algorithms.90 But the level of consumer 
information revealed through merchant categories is also quite limited in 
many cases, such as with “Supermarkets” and “Book Stores.” For example, a 
Card Network or card issuer would not be able to tell if a consumer’s grocery 
store purchase was an ethnic food product (e.g., a Manischewitz or Goya 
brand product), if a consumer’s pharmacy purchase was a contraceptive, or if 
a purchase from a “miscellaneous general merchandise” merchant was a sex 
toy. All that to say, with traditional plastic cards, specific consumption 
information remains obfuscated from the Card Networks and card issuers. 
The result of this situation is that traditional plastic cards do not provide a 
comprehensive view of a consumer’s purchasing habits. Instead, the consumer’s 
transactional habits are divided into distinct silos. Although the consumer does 
 
87 Id. at 6. Banks will offer merchants lower merchant fee rates in exchange for SKU-level data. 
See, e.g., Level 3 Processing, supra note 59. 
88 For a directory of classification codes used by Visa, see Visa Merchant Category Classification (MCC) 
Codes Directory, VISA [hereinafter Visa MCC Directory], https://www.dm.usda.gov/procurement/card/card_x/
mcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/J43T-XUY8]. 
89 See id. 
90 See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 75, FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-cv-1976 (N.D. Ga. June 
10, 2008). In that case, CompuCredit settled for an estimated $114 million in consumer restitution 
plus injunctive relief. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Subprime Credit Card Marketer to 
Provide At Least $114 Million in Consumer Redress to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptive Conduct 
(Dec. 19, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/subprime-credit-card-
marketer-provide-least-114-million-consumer [https://perma.cc/C92M-CSUR]. 
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not have privacy over particular transactions, she retains a certain level of 
privacy because no one has a detailed overview of her entire transactional life. 
It is of course possible for data from individual transactions to be aggregated, 
but such aggregation is unlikely in the traditional plastic card context. Merchants 
are loathe to share their data with other merchants or financial institutions, and 
card issuers are loathe to share their cardholders’ information with other issuers. 
Digital wallets potentially change this privacy picture. A digital wallet can 
aggregate data on payments at multiple merchants using multiple payment 
accounts because all the data is stored in one place. It can also combine this data 
with data on the consumer’s past web browsing and geolocation.91 Digital wallets 
can even potentially add SKU-level data for transactions if the consumer uses a 
web- or app-based shopping cart, or if the merchant provides a digital receipt. Not 
all digital wallets collect or combine such information, but the possibility of such 
wide-reaching data collection substantially changes consumer privacy in 
commercial transactions. A much fuller picture of the consumer’s search, location, 
and purchasing habits is potentially available through a digital wallet than through 
a traditional plastic card. The level of privacy that traditional plastic cards 
preserved through information siloing is thus readily lost with digital wallets. 
Further, the integrated portrait of a consumer’s transactional life is not 
the consumer’s to control. It can be shared or sold with virtually any entity, 
and unlike merchants and card issuers, digital wallet providers can only 
readily monetize the data through sales to third parties.92 
The data aggregation facilitated by digital wallets enables much more 
targeted advertising and rewards, which is a boon to some consumers. Not all 
consumers, however, want to part with their privacy or want targeted advertising 
and rewards, and the degree of control a consumer has over his or her privacy is 
likely to be limited and opaquely disclosed through general disclosures regarding 
the collection and sharing of data. Digital wallets thus pose a privacy risk to 
consumers. Consumers might be willing to part with some or all of their privacy, 
but by using a digital wallet, the consumer can easily lose control of her privacy 
to a degree that she may not anticipate or fully understand. 
 
91 Cf. Privacy, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/your-data.html [https://perma.cc/G5Q5-
Z623] (describing how Google collects data from its users, including their websites browsed, 
locations visited, and videos watched). 
92 See Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. What Can You Do About It?, NPR: ALL 
TECH CONSIDERED (July 11, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/07/11/
485571291/firms-are-buying-sharing-your-online-info-what-can-you-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/5LHN-
D8TX] (“There are some big companies out there that . . . know more about you than you can imagine . . . . 
There are few regulations governing these [data] brokers.”). 
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3. The Need for a CFPB Digital Wallet Rulemaking 
Consumers have limited ability to manage the risks posed by digital wallets 
and have no ability to bargain directly with wallet providers over terms and 
conditions. Instead, they can pick which digital wallet they prefer, or they can 
“just say no” and eschew the use of digital wallets altogether—at least for as 
long as they can continue to transact using traditional payment media. 
The ability to pick among digital wallets generates some amount of 
competition, which can provide some protection for consumers by generating 
better terms. Some digital wallets are specific to a particular payment card or 
financial institution, and many are capable of piggybacking on accounts at a range 
of financial institutions and Card Networks.93 Accordingly, consumers generally 
have extensive options when choosing among the various digital wallets in the 
market, and are not even bound to using only a single wallet. But competition is 
only likely to provide consumer protection when product terms are salient 
enough that consumers can in fact notice and use them to distinguish between 
different products. Consumer choice will not bring market pressure to bear on 
terms that are either non-salient or on which products cannot be differentiated. 
And for security and privacy, unfortunately, there is little reason to think 
that market pressure is likely to be effective. Consumers have little ability to 
gauge the strength of different digital wallets’ security features or to understand 
the privacy implications of different wallets given the broad data sharing 
language that is typically included in privacy disclosures. This suggests that 
there may be a role for regulatory intervention to mandate minimum security 
measures, deposit insurance coverage, and privacy standards for digital wallets. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has both the jurisdiction and 
regulatory authority to codify the aforementioned suggestions regarding security 
measures, deposit insurance coverage, and privacy standards. It can use 
rulemaking to proscribe unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts and practices by 
“covered persons.”94 Covered persons are defined as persons who offer or provide 
consumer financial products or services,95 including transmitting funds, providing 
stored-value payment instruments, and providing payments “by any technological 
means.”96 While there may be questions regarding the status of any particular 
 
93 See supra Part I. 
94 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (2012). 
95 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). 
96 Id. at (15)(A) (defining “financial product or service” to include any payments or data 
processing by an technological means). There is a jurisdictional carveout for “electronic 
conduit services.” Id. at (15)(C)(ii); see also id. at (11) (defining  
electronic conduit services as people other than the payor or payee in a transaction who 
electronically transfer consumer financial data but do not select or modify its content, or 
handle it differently from other types of data they transfer). 
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party involved in the provision of a digital wallet, it is impossible to provide a 
digital wallet without the involvement of one or more covered persons.97 
The Bureau’s authority over covered persons includes the authority to 
prohibit “abusive” acts or practices, such as those that take unreasonable 
advantage of (i) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; (ii) the inability 
of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using 
a consumer financial product or service; or (iii) the reasonable reliance by the 
consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.98 
Unclear legal regimes, security measures, deposit insurance, and privacy issues 
can all fit into these prongs. The governing legal regime is a material risk of a digital 
wallet. Consumers are unlikely to understand the particular details of the legal 
regimes governing different sorts of payments, and to the extent that a staged wallet 
results in a shift to a less favorable legal regime, it could be an abusive act or practice. 
The CFPB has already brought enforcement actions under the abusive power 
based on consumers’ lack of understanding of the applicable legal regime for 
usurious loans and debt collection (including forum selection).99 Based on these 
past enforcement actions, it is plausible to read the prohibition on “abusive acts or 
practices” to extend to digital wallets with unclear legal regimes, inadequate 
security measures, lack of deposit insurance, or overreaching data collection. 
Security features are also a material risk of digital wallets. Consumers are 
unlikely to understand the particular security features on digital wallets.100 
Consumers are also unlikely to be able to distinguish between the strength of 
security features between digital wallets, which makes it impossible for them 
to protect their interests when deciding which digital wallet to use.101 As a 
result, consumers might reasonably rely on digital wallet providers to act in 
their interests by using the best possible security measures. 
Deposit insurance coverage is another material risk for some digital 
wallets. Consumers are able to maintain a balance on a staged wallet—funds 
 
97 The CFPB also has authority over entities that provide services to covered persons, related 
parties of covered persons, and parties that provide substantial assistance to unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive acts and practices. See § 5531(a); see also § 5481(25)–(26). 
98 § 5531(d)(2). 
99 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 69–71, CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167(GAO) 
(D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2014) (describing the defendants’ actions that allegedly constituted abusive acts or 
practices under the CFPA, including attempting to take loan balances on loans rendered void by local 
usury and licensing laws); Complaint for Injunctive Relief at Damages at ¶¶ 74–78, 80–81, CFPB v. 
Freedom Stores, Inc., No. 2:14cv643ANA/TEM (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2014) (charging the practices that were 
allegedly abusive in violation of the CFPA, including filing debt-collection lawsuits in Virginia against 
consumers who did not understand or negotiate their contract’s forum-selection clause). 
100 See Survey: Despite All the Digital Wallet Buzz, Few Consumers Understand or Use One, 
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/survey_-despite-all-
the-digital-wallet-buzz-few-consumers-understand-or-use-one/ [https://perma.cc/A9RS-6P7F]. 
101 Id. 
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held for the consumer by the wallet provider. If the digital wallet provider 
were to fail, the consumer would be a general unsecured creditor of the wallet 
provider, with no guarantee of ever being able to access the funds, in contrast 
to an FDIC-insured deposit. 
Consumers may be unaware that their balances on most staged wallets are 
not FDIC-insured because this fact is not prominently disclosed, in contrast 
to what is required for uninsured depository institutions.102 Instead, the lack 
of federal deposit insurance for staged wallet balances is buried in the fine 
print of the user agreement, which few consumers are likely to view. The same 
transparency concern applies to all digital wallets in regard to ensuring the 
continued availability of consumer financial data in the event of insolvency, a 
risk against which consumers have no ability to protect. 
Transactional privacy concerns also fit under alternative prongs of the 
“abusive” standard and present a material risk to digital wallet users. Consumers 
may well not understand the implications to their transactional privacy because 
of the unsiloing of data facilitated by digital wallets. Likewise, because of the 
vague and general enabling wording of privacy policies, consumers have little 
ability to differentiate between digital wallets in terms of actual practices, so 
they cannot protect their interests through consumption choices.103 
All of this suggests that the CFPB, under its power to prohibit “abusive” acts 
and practices, can regulate digital wallets that do not meet minimum standards 
for clarity of legal regime, security features, deposit insurance coverage, and 
transactional privacy. What those minimum standards should be is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but such rules would likely facilitate, rather than constrain, 
the growth of the digital wallet market by giving consumers greater confidence 
in digital wallet products, just as limits on unauthorized transaction liability 
encourage consumer use of traditional credit and debit card products. 
 
102 Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1831t(b) (2012) (mandating depository institutions conspicuously and 
routinely disclose a lack of federal deposit insurance). Notably, the term “depository institution” 
reaches any entity the CFPB determines is in the business of receiving deposits or which could be 
reasonably mistaken for a depository institution by its customers. Id. at (e)(2)(B)(ii). This leaves 
open the possibility of the CFPB defining staged-wallet providers as depository institutions and 
thus requiring prominent disclosure of the lack of FDIC deposit insurance. 
103 The CFPB also has rulemaking authority under the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6804 (2012), which “requires financial institutions to explain their information sharing 
practices to their consumers and to safeguard sensitive data.” Graham-Leach-Biley Act, FTC, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/graham-leach-bliley-act [https://perma.
cc/D4JT-3FZ8]; see 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(J) (2012) (noting that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act constitutes an 
applicable “enumerated consumer law”). Given the limited statutory scope of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s 
privacy provisions, however, the CFPB would likely have to act under its UDAAP power. Chris Hoofnagle 
and others have proposed adopting a modified federal version of California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, 
which prohibits merchants engaging in mobile transactions from soliciting certain information from credit 
card–using consumers. See HOOFNAGLE ET AL., supra note 85, at 16-17. 
346 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 305 
B. Merchant Benefits and Risks from Digital Wallets 
1. Merchant Benefits from Digital Wallets 
For retailers, digital wallets offer some attractions as payment devices—in 
particular, potentially greater tender speed—but the real attraction of digital wallets 
goes beyond payments: digital wallets are the potential lynchpin for an integrated 
suite of retailing services covering the entire retail experience from advertising and 
consumer search functions to payment and shipping, returns, and loyalty programs. 
In twentieth-century commerce, these various retailing services were 
splintered on multiple platforms. The consumer obtained information about 
products through a variety of channels, ranging from store windows to 
advertisements to Internet searches. The advertising and search functions were 
completely delinked from the payment process, and the payment process was not 
connected with tracking of shipping, returns, or customer loyalty programs. Thus 
in twentieth-century commerce, each retailing function was essentially siloed. 
This siloing limited retailers’ ability to exploit consumer data because no 
one in the purchasing chain had a complete informational picture. For example, 
a traditional brick-and-mortar retailer generally knows only about the sales it 
has made, not about consumers’ unsuccessful searches. Moreover, even though 
that retailer is able to match the consumer’s credit card purchases made using 
the same card by using the consumer’s name and card number, the retailer is 
not able to match transactions made by the same consumer using different 
payment methods because consumer names are not unique. This is why some 
merchants use loyalty cards that provide a unique identifier for the consumer 
that can be used for all transactions, irrespective of payment method.104 
Twenty-first century retailing involves the integration of these different 
functions into a single platform that provides search, payment, and 
relationship management functions. This integrated retail platform gives 
merchants greater ability to attract and retain customers. The integration of 
payments and communications can be very beneficial for both consumers and 
merchants, although it does raise important consumer privacy concerns. 
Integrated retail platforms already exist for many eCommerce merchants. 
Amazon, for example, already provides a well-integrated platform for these services 
within its universe. Amazon provides advertising and a search function, it stores 
payment information in its own digital wallet, and it enables tracking of shipments 
and return processing on the same platform. In contrast, traditional retailers lack 
information about unsuccessful searches, repeat searches and purchases, items 
saved for later in digital shopping carts, and even how long consumers spend 
looking at particular products or placing their mouse on a particular product’s 
 
104 HOOFNAGLE ET AL., supra note 85, at 6. 
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portion of a display.105 Twenty-first century commerce creates an incredible wealth 
of consumer information for merchants, and that information can be analyzed and 
monetized. Amazon has pursued this twenty-first century retailing model within a 
single firm that sells nearly everything.106 
A successful integrated digital retail platform requires two-way 
communications. The consumer needs to be able to transmit a range of information 
to the merchant, and the merchant needs to be able to transmit a range of 
information to the consumer. This is not possible with a traditional “dumb” 
payment card. The traditional plastic card is a one-way communication device that 
transmits payment authorization data and nothing more. It is, by definition, not 
integrated into a larger retail platform. Putting such a card into a digital wallet, 
however, makes it possible to integrate payments into an all-encompassing retail 
services suite. Digital wallets promise to bring the online integrated retail 
experience into brick-and-mortar commerce through mobile devices. 
While it is possible to offer many of the other services separately from 
payments, integrating payments into the retail suite makes the transaction 
more seamless for the consumer. This is important for retailers because the 
more seamless a transaction is, the less likely it is that the consumer will 
become distracted or have second thoughts and not go through with the 
purchase. For online retailers in particular, “abandoned carts” are a major 
problem—one index has found abandonment rates of 78%107—and most often 
at the payment stage.108 One of the causes of abandonment is issues with 
payments—including excessive security checks and declines—that would not 
occur with a digital wallet.109 Avoiding these issues by integrating payments 
into a retail platform should ultimately then result in more completed sales. 
Digital wallets thus affect not just payments but the very model of retailing. 
 
105 See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 782 (2017) (noting that 
traditional stores cannot match the “scale and sophistication” of Amazon’s information collection efforts). 
106 Of course, there are other approaches too, including a platform that is not firm-specific, but instead 
covers almost everything by encompassing multiple firms through a single gateway. Amazon also presents this 
model with its third-party sellers, but the structure still allows Amazon to capture data on all sellers’ sales. 
107 Listrak Shopping Cart Abandonment Index, LISTRAK, https://www.listrak.com/digital-
marketing_automation/multichannel-marketing-solutions/email-marketing/shopping-cart-
abandonment-index.aspx [https://perma.cc/6Z3Q-VDTE]. 
108 Andrew Meola, ECommerce Retailers Are Losing Their Customers Because of This One Critical 
Mistake, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2016, 2:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/eCommerce-
shoppers-abandon-carts-at-payment-stage-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/G9T9-CTD7] (noting that as 
many as 74% of online carts are abandoned at the payment stage, particularly because “consumers 
have little to no desire to manually enter all of their information”). 
109 Why Online Retailers Are Losing 67.45% of Sales and What to Do About It, SHOPIFY (Aug. 6, 
2013), https://www.shopify.com/blog/8484093-why-online-retailers-are-losing-67-45-of-sales-and-
what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/V4ZU-QMSP] (noting eighteen percent of consumers 
abandon their shopping carts due to excessive payment security checks). 
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2. Merchant Risks from Digital Wallets 
a. Control Over Customer Data 
The single most important concern for merchants regarding digital wallets 
is the loss of control over customer data. Digital wallets are an informationally 
rich environment compared to traditional plastic cards. A digital wallet can 
potentially tie together information about a consumer’s web searches, 
transactions (on multiple cards), physical locations (current and past), and 
contact information (such as email address and phone number). The collection 
of this linked information enables advanced consumer behavior analytics. It 
also creates a channel for realtime marketing communications. The consumer 
behavior data and communications channel can be combined, in turn, to 
produce very targeted advertising and offers for consumers. 
The problem digital wallets present for merchants is that although merchants 
sow the seeds for the informational crop, they are not the ones who reap its harvest. 
The additional information about a consumer generated by a digital wallet is 
controlled neither by the merchant nor by the consumer. Instead, it is controlled by 
the digital wallet provider and/or the payment card network.110 Indeed, because of 
tokenization, digital wallets can result in an informational diminution for 
merchants (as discussed in the following subsections). So despite the greater 
informational wealth created by digital wallets, merchants come out worse—not 
only does all of the additional value go to other parties, but digital wallet payments 
may produce less informational value for merchants than traditional card payments. 
The problem merchants face, however, is not simply that other parties can 
harvest and harness the additional data generated by digital wallet 
transactions, but that nothing prevents digital wallet providers or the Card 
Networks from selling the data to third parties, including the merchant’s 
competitors, who can then use it to poach the merchant’s customer 
relationships. The merchants interviewed for this Article—all Fortune 500 
firms—unanimously described this concern as among their most pressing. 
For example, hypothetical fast food restaurant Tast-i-Fast could enter into a deal 
with a digital wallet provider under which Tast-i-Fast obtains information on all of 
 
110 Aside from merchant issues, there is an additional level of competition between the Card Networks 
and independent digital wallet providers. The Card Networks have at times exercised their market power to 
ensure they are the entities that control the information generated by digital wallets. MasterCard imposed 
additional fees on “staged digital wallets,” like those of Google Pay and PayPal, which do not pass along details 
of the transaction to MasterCard. These fees are meant to ensure that the data flows to MasterCard, so that 
it can construct a detailed profile of the cardholder’s spending habits. See Sarah Clark, MasterCard Fights Back 
Against New Payments Players with Increased Transaction Fees for Digital Wallets that Don’t Share Data, NFC 
WORLD (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.nfcworld.com/2013/03/20/323195/mastercard-fights-back-against-new-
payments-players-with-increased-transaction-fees-for-digital-wallets-that-dont-share-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/YH9N-JGNJ]. 
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the digital wallet transactions at its competitor Quick-i-Serve. This is hardly what 
Quick-i-Serve wants—why should it be generating data for its competitor’s benefit? 
The possibility of the Card Networks selling data on a merchant’s 
transactions to a competitor already exists with traditional plastic cards, though 
that information is of limited use. If Tast-i-Fast purchased traditional plastic 
card information from a network, it would generally not be able to link purchases 
made on different cards to the same consumer. Nor would it be able to link the 
information to either the consumer’s web searches or physical location. These 
factors limit the analytical value of the information. Even if Tast-i-Fast could 
generate a compelling insight from its information to attract consumers away 
from Quick-i-Serve, it could not communicate that offer to the consumers in 
real time. At best, it could use targeted advertising and hope that the message 
would not decay between the time of receipt and the time of a purchase. 
These limitations on linking and utilizing information disappear with a 
digital wallet. A digital wallet provider can sell a much richer selection of 
consumer data and realtime communication access to the consumer. Consider 
this scenario: Meg has used her smartphone-based digital wallet to purchase baby 
supplies and baby furniture. Meg now goes shopping at The Store, a large retailer. 
As soon as she enters The Store’s parking lot, she receives this text message from 
her digital wallet provider: “Hi Meg! We see you’re in The Store’s parking lot. 
We wanted to let you know that TheWeb.com is offering diapers at ten percent 
less than The Store, and with free shipping, but only if you purchase in the next 
hour (through this link).” Not one to turn down a good deal, Meg selects the link, 
purchases the diapers online, and drives out of The Store’s parking lot without 
even getting out of her car. The Store has lost her business to TheWeb.com. 
How did this happen? Meg’s digital wallet provider knows her general type 
of purchases, and is able to determine the stores she frequents, though perhaps 
not the exact items she purchases. It is also able to see her web searches, and 
because of a geolocation sensor in the smartphone, it can determine where Meg 
has gone and when. That allows the digital wallet provider to guess the types 
of items Meg might be interested in purchasing, and to identify when she is on 
the cusp of a potential purchase. That data can then be sold to a merchant, such 
as TheWeb.com, which can swoop in with a better offer for Meg (with access 
to Meg’s device again provided by the digital wallet provider). 
For Meg this might be a great deal: she has gotten cheaper diapers, and 
saved some time. But it is a bad deal for The Store, which loses a sale of diapers, 
any potential impulse buys Meg might make, and any revenue that would result 
if Meg would have paid for the purchase with The Store’s private-label or 
co-branded payment card. The Store is getting scooped on these transactions 
because it has lost control over customer information because of the digital wallet. 
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Now consider the possibility that the digital wallet provider is itself a large 
online retailer. The scenario above would allow such a retailer to scoop 
business away from brick-and-mortar retailers. Brick-and-mortar retailers’ 
fear over being scooped by online competitors is hardly a far-fetched scenario: 
Walmart is sufficiently concerned about Amazon obtaining data on its sales 
that it forbids its vendors from using Amazon cloud computing services.111 
The Honor All Wallets rules, discussed later in subsection II.B.3, prevent the 
brick-and-mortar retailer from taking steps to protect its business from poaching 
via mobile devices. If the brick-and-mortar retailer accepts Visa payments through 
NFC, it must accept them from all Visa NFC devices, ranging from NFC-enabled 
plastic cards to NFC digital wallets, including digital wallets offered by its 
competitors. Thus if Amazon were to offer an NFC-based digital wallet (to which 
it could potentially migrate the 150 million or so payment accounts it already has in 
its web-based digital wallet), brick-and-mortar retailers that take NFC payments 
would have to accept it and give Amazon access to their customer information. 
Payment companies that employ co-branded cards (e.g., a United Airlines 
Visa) already have insight into customer behavior, but a smartphone digital 
wallet is a realtime communications channel with geolocation, enabling 
timely and targeted offers, advertisements, and coupons in a way that a 
co-branded card does not. Moreover, with a co-branded card, the consumer 
must sign up (and qualify) for the card. Providing a digital wallet is much 
simpler; the consumer has already signed up and qualified for the card(s) and 
just has to put it in the wallet. Subsequently, the wallet provider or Card 
Network can gain a window into the transacting on all of the cards on the wallet. 
Digital wallets thus present a material change in the terms under which a 
merchant transacts. When merchants transact with a digital wallet, they 
surrender data that might be used to poach their future sales. Every digital 
wallet transaction carries a set of competitive risks that traditional plastic 
cards do not. These risks are not necessarily identical for all digital wallets. 
Merchants, however, are forced to accept them all if they take any using a 
particular technology. Thus merchants receive materially less value with 
digital wallet transactions than with traditional plastic cards. 
For some merchants, device-based digital wallets present an additional 
competitive threat. Some merchants already provide their own web-based digital 
wallets that store payment card authorization data. These merchants have made a 
major investment to get consumer data and now face disintermediation and loss 
 
111 See Dennis Green, IT’S WAR: Walmart Is Telling its Vendors to Stop Using Amazon’s Cloud, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 22, 2017, 12:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/walmart-tells-its-tech-providers-
to-stop-using-amazon-services-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/KCQ3-PMNP]; see also Khan, supra note 105, 
at 755 (“Amazon gleans information from . . . competitors as a service provider that it may use to gain 
a further advantage over them as rivals—enabling it to further entrench its dominant position.”). 
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of control over the data. For instance, while airlines are primarily card-not-present 
merchants, they do some business in card-present settings at ticket counters and 
on planes. Many airlines offer their own web-based digital wallets. If customers 
use competing digital wallets for card-not-present ticket purchases from a specific 
airline, the informational value of the airline’s digital wallet diminishes. 
b. Customer Relationship Management 
Digital wallets can also interfere with merchants’ ability to manage 
customer relationships. If a consumer is having difficulty transacting with a 
digital wallet, a merchant’s sales associate is unlikely to be able to assist, 
because the sales associate may not be familiar with that particular wallet. The 
customer, however, might still hold the merchant responsible for his or her 
inability to transact and be reluctant to patronize the merchant again. 
When digital wallets tokenize payments, further customer relationship 
management issues may emerge. With a tokenized payment, the merchant sees 
only the token, not the PAN. Merchants use PANs for a variety of purposes 
including returns, chargebacks, product safety recalls, loyalty programs, fraud 
prevention, and anti–money laundering compliance. Tokenization interferes 
with these applications of the PAN. For example, if a husband and wife are both 
on a credit card account, their plastic cards will have the same PAN. Therefore, 
if the husband mistakenly purchases the wrong item, the wife can return the 
item with a receipt and her credit card because her card’s PAN will match that 
on the receipt: the PANs for multiple cards on the same account are the same. 
With tokenization, however, the husband and wife will each have separate and 
unassociated tokens, and the wife will be unable to return her husband’s 
misguided purchase. Indeed, some manufacturers like Apple have 
device-specific tokens, meaning that a receipt from an ApplePay purchase 
using an iPad would not correspond to an ApplePay purchase made with an 
iPhone. Likewise, some token service providers (such as American Express) 
provide domain-specific tokens, so an NFC payment would have a different token 
than a Chip transaction.112 While some merchants have work-arounds, such as 
additional loyalty card data that can provide an alternative method of identifying 
the customer, not all do, and maintaining such a program can be costly. 
Likewise, the ability to see PANs lets merchants track customers’ purchase 
histories. This can be used for advertising and loyalty programs, as well as for 
product safety recalls, fraud prevention, and anti–money laundering compliance. 
If a merchant sees that a customer has been purchasing baby products, for 
example, the merchant may want to send the customer targeted advertisements 
about other baby products or coupons for such products. By creating a 
 
112 See generally American Express Token Service, supra note 40. 
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transactional history trail, payment card transactions provide merchants with a 
form of value that cash transactions do not. Similarly, if a merchant sees an 
attempted purchase that is inconsistent with a past transaction history in terms 
of location, amount, or item, it may raise red flags about potential fraud. And the 
ability to track multiple purchases enables merchants to spot suspicious purchase 
patterns (such as repeat mass purchases of stored value cards) for which anti–
money laundering law requires suspicious activity reports.113 
EMVCo has developed a specification for a Payment Account Reference 
(PAR), a twenty-nine digit alphanumeric sequence that would be consistent for 
an account regardless of form factor, but which could not itself be used to 
authorize payment.114 Use of PARs, however, is potentially expensive. First, 
merchants must adapt their systems to handle these twenty-nine digit sequences. 
This can involve reprogramming thousands of point-of-sale terminals, which can 
in turn necessitate recertification of those terminals. Moreover, the PAR would 
be supplied by the token service provider—Visa, MasterCard, or AmEx. The 
U.S. PIN-debit networks are not certified as token providers by EMV and thus 
cannot provide PARs. Token service provider control over the PARs means that 
the providers could charge for PARs, thereby increasing merchants’ cost of 
accepting payments. Ironically, then, while tokenization might decrease payment 
fraud rates, it could result in higher costs to merchants. 
c. Tender Choice and Payment Routing 
Digital wallets can affect both tender choice and payment routing. Tender 
choice refers to the type of payment the consumer chooses to use, such as 
credit, debit, or ACH. To the extent that digital wallets affect tender choice, 
it could result in a generational shift in tender overall given millennials’ high 
use of mobile devices. 
Tender choice is often determined by the very setup of a digital wallet. 
Some digital wallets, such as those offered directly by individual banks, allow 
only that bank’s cards to be used. Thus Capital One Wallet (using Android 
host-card emulation) and ChasePay (using QR codes) allow the use of only 
Capital One and Chase cards, respectively. 
Other digital wallets are open to cards from multiple financial 
institutions, but that does not necessarily translate to a diversity of cards in 
the wallet, much less active competition for transactions. While consumers 
might carry multiple cards in a physical wallet, they will frequently load only 
 
113 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2017). 
114 EMVCO, LLC, PAYMENT ACCOUNT REFERENCE  (Jan. 2016), https://www.emvco.com/terms-
of-use/?u=wp-content/uploads/documents/SB-167_Payment_Account_Reference_PAR_20160129015654268.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7VEZ-JWRJ] (defining PAR as a “non-financial reference . . . [with a] fixed length 29 
character data format”). 
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a single card onto a digital wallet. The “top of the wallet” card is often the 
only card on a digital wallet. In this sense, digital wallets are often less 
“wallets” than simply digital versions of a single plastic card. 
Because many consumers load only a single card onto a digital wallet, to the 
extent that consumers can be steered to loading a particular card onto the wallet, 
it effectively steers the consumer’s choice of tender. Some digital wallets, like 
ApplePay and SamsungPay, were rolled out initially with participation by only 
credit card issuers. As a result, the first cards loaded on these wallets—and 
therefore the default card for the payments from the wallet absent additional 
consumer action—were credit cards. The result is a tender shift toward credit, 
and away from debit, at least for early adopters of these wallets. 
Intellectual property rights may also affect tender and routing steering for 
digital wallets. For example, mobile wallets based on smartphones, like 
ApplePay and SamsungPay, offer consumers the option to authorize individual 
payments using biometrics—specifically, fingerprint scans. The use of a 
biometric for authorization is (in theory) quicker, easier, and more secure than 
having to enter a PIN number. Biometric authorization, however, is available 
only for credit and signature-debit cards; it is not available for PIN-debit 
cards. This is because when EMVCo, the joint venture between the major 
credit card networks, licensed the Common Payment Application—EMV’s 
chip card specification—to U.S. debit Card Networks, the license did not 
include biometric Customer Verification Method (CVM). Thus ApplePay’s 
default biometric CVM is not enabled for PIN-debit networks. This 
discourages use of PIN-debit and encourages use of credit or signature-debit. 
Digital wallets may also affect routing choices. Routing refers to the 
processing of a transaction, and it can have a major effect on cost. A debit 
transaction that is routed through a signature-debit network is much more 
expensive for a merchant than if it were routed through a PIN-debit 
network.115 
Additionally, there is differential ease of use for different types of payments 
with digital wallets. The differential ease of use can result either from the 
economic deals of digital wallet providers or from intellectual property rights 
limitations. Digital wallet providers can have an incentive to steer payment toward 
certain payment card networks’ products or even toward certain banks’ cards as 
part of their own economic deals, although to date this has not manifested itself. 
 
115 See Average Debit Card Interchange Fee by Payment card network, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. 
RES. SYS. (July 14, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/regii-average-
interchange-fee.htm [https://perma.cc/TRR4-TR83] (listing the average dual-message (signature-
debit) interchange fee as 0.89% of average transaction values, compared to 0.64% of average 
transaction value for single-message (PIN debit) networks). 
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The combination of digital wallets and Chip technology also facilitates issuer 
steering of routing choices for debit card transactions. The Durbin Amendment 
requires that all debit cards have the possibility of being routed over two 
unaffiliated networks,116 and that merchants be allowed to determine the routing of 
the transaction.117 For magnetic stripe transactions, merchants are able to choose 
the routing based on the bank identification number on the card. For domestic 
Chip transactions, the routing selection is done through the AID software on the 
merchant’s point-of-sale Chip terminal. The AID selects between different routing 
applications on the Chip card’s chip. Not all routing applications contain the same 
routing choices. For example, MasterCard and Visa each have a “Common AID” 
for U.S. domestic transactions that contains all domestic PIN and signature-debit 
networks.118 Additionally, MasterCard and Visa have their own AIDs, that contain, 
respectively, only MasterCard (and its Maestro PIN-debit subsidiary)119 and Visa 
(and its Interlink PIN-debit subsidiary) networks.120 
The use of a mobile wallet potentially enables the cardholder to override 
the Common AID in favor of the MasterCard AID or Visa AID (which do 
not contain unaffiliated PIN-debit networks), thereby undermining 
merchants’ ability to choose the transaction routing. The override would work 
similar to the traditional magnetic stripe debit routing choice of pressing 
“credit” (for signature-debit) or “debit” (for PIN-debit). The cardholder can, 
in turn, be encouraged by an issuer or Card Network to exercise the override 
either by direct financial incentives, such as rewards for transactions run over 
particular network or by more subtle cues, such as the placement of AID 
choices on the device screen or the names assigned to the choices. 
For example, a mobile wallet might ask the consumer if she wants to pay 
with “Visa debit” or “U.S. debit.” The consumer knows that she has a Visa card 
because of the Visa logo on the front of the card. She likely does not know that 
her Visa card is also a card capable of running on one or more unaffiliated 
 
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“[A]n issuer . . . shall not . . . restrict the number of 
payment card networks on which an electric debit transaction may be processed to 1 such network; or 2 
or more . . . [affiliated] networks.”). For Durbin Amendment purposes, the “debit card” refers to the 
individual account, not the digital wallet application. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 43,394, 43,409 (July 20, 2011) (“The entire virtual wallet is not considered to be the card . . . .”). 
117 § 1693o-2(b)(1)(B) (“[A]n issuer . . . shall not . . . inhibit the ability of any person who 
accepts debit cards for payments to direct the routing of electronic debit transactions for processing 
over any payment card network that may process such transactions.”). 
118 See SHAZAM, EMV (June 2014), https://www.shazam.net/pdf/EMVUpdate_June2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4UP] (explaining that a common AID “helps the terminal and card ‘talk’ to each other” 
in domestic EMV transactions and the global AID “helps the terminal and card ‘talk’ to each other” in 
international EMV transactions). 
119 See MASTERCARD ADVISORS, MERCHANT ADVISORY GROUP EMV WORKSHOP 18 (2014), 
http://www.merchantadvisorygroup.org/docs/default-source/2014-mid-year-conference/mag-emv-workshop-
2014-0211-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSTF-SYQM]. 
120 See VISA TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE GUIDE, supra note 37, at 211. 
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PIN-debit networks. At best, these networks’ logos will appear on the back of 
the card, but none are called “U.S. debit,” which is a generic moniker for PIN-
debit networks. When faced with the choice between the known brand and the 
unknown brand, the consumer is likely to choose the known brand, resulting in 
the payment being routed as a more expensive Visa signature-debit transaction. 
This issue has already appeared on Chip terminals at point-of-sale, where a 
screen appears for the cardholder to “select payment.” Merchants can reprogram 
their Chip terminals to turn off this selection screen, but doing so may 
necessitate EMV compliance recertification and leave the merchant exposed to 
counterfeit fraud liability under the EMV liability shift rule in the interim. Only 
the very largest and most sophisticated merchants are likely to attempt to 
reprogram their Chip terminals. With a mobile wallet, however, reprogramming 
is not an option for the merchant. The routing override may well be a violation 
of the Durbin Amendment and rules thereunder, but to the extent it occurs on 
mobile wallets, it will be more difficult for merchants to identify and address. 
d. Fraud and Data Security 
Digital wallets pose fraud and data-security breach risks for merchants. 
Payment card fraud and data security breaches are injurious to merchants in 
numerous ways. First, merchants lose the value of the goods and services they 
part with to the fraudster. Second, they lose the costs of restocking and of 
dealing with the fraud administratively. Third, they may suffer reputational 
damage vis-à-vis the consumers whose accounts were used for unauthorized 
transactions. Fourth, merchants may face liability to consumers related to the 
fraud. Fifth, if a breach results in fraud for other merchants, the breached 
merchant might be liable for the losses. And sixth, merchants pay merchant 
discount fees even on the fraudulent transactions. Merchant discount fees are 
sometimes refunded in certain cases with unauthorized transactions involving 
mobile wallets, but the inability to identify which transactions were 
undertaken with which form-factor means that merchants are unable to verify 
that they have been properly credited with reversals of merchant discount fees. 
Different technologies present different security risks, and even within a 
technology, different form factors or devices may pose different security risks. 
Some digital wallets may be more vulnerable to use by fraudsters, who will 
load fake or unauthorized accounts onto digital wallets. This was a significant 
problem with ApplePay’s initial rollout.121 Moreover, the security of 
communications between a digital wallet and a merchant may vary by device. 
To the extent that there is a data security breach in the communications 
 
121 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pointing Fingers in Apple Pay Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/banks-find-fraud-abounds-in-apple-pay.html 
[https://perma.cc/WQ5u-X7MD]. 
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process, the stolen data can itself be used for unauthorized transactions. Even 
if the unauthorized transactions occur at other merchants, there can still be 
serious reputational harm to the breached merchants, which might also have 
liability to other merchants and consumers. 
The Honor All Wallets rules and lack of ability to identify devices means 
that merchants cannot protect themselves either proactively or reactively by 
declining to accept certain devices or by limiting the types of purchases they 
will allow on a device. For example, even if a merchant were to believe that 
communications via certain NFC wearables were compromisable, the 
merchant could not refuse to accept NFC payments from those wearables. 
Likewise, if a security problem were to emerge with specific wallets, allowing 
them to be used for fraudulent transactions, merchants could not protect 
themselves reactively by limiting purchases of open-loop gift cards (a favorite 
purchase for fraudsters) or of high-value items with ApplePay. The Honor All 
Wallets rules prevent merchants from refusing to accept or from discriminating 
against less secure devices despite the risks they pose to merchants. 
e. Intellectual Property Liability 
Patent trolls are a fact of modern business life. Patent trolls are firms that 
purchase patents for the purpose of bringing litigation against alleged infringers of 
the patents. As a result, patent trolls will often sue indiscriminately any party that 
has had any interaction with a patent. 
Mobile wallets involve new (and changing) technologies that can 
implicate a range of patents. As a result, they are a fertile ground for patent 
trolling. While merchants are generally involved in mobile wallets only as 
recipients of payments (or potentially as users in the case of chargebacks and 
returns), large merchants make tempting targets for patent trolls. Indeed, 
some of the merchants interviewed for this Article have been sued for patent 
infringement on the basis of their acceptance of contactless payments. 
Because merchants have no ability to determine exactly what 
technology—and thus what patents—are implicated by a particular payment’s 
communication medium, they have little ability to protect themselves against 
potential patent infringement liability other than by negotiating for 
indemnification from their acquirer banks. The acquirer banks themselves, 
however, do not have control over which technologies are allowed to access a 
payment card network. That decision is controlled solely by the Card 
Network itself. 
Standard law-and-economics theory dictates that liability should be placed 
on the party with the lowest cost to avoid a harm, the so-called “least-cost 
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avoider.”122 In the case of patent liability for mobile wallets, the only party with 
the ability to avoid the harm of patent infringement is the Card Network because 
it is the party that makes the decision whether to allow technology to access the 
network. Placing the liability on the least-cost avoider would suggest that the 
Card Networks should completely indemnify merchants for any patent 
infringement liability caused by accepting a device approved by the network. The 
fact that merchants are not completely indemnified by the Card Networks means 
that the Card Networks do not internalize the full cost of patent infringement, 
so they are not incentivized to take the optimal level of care when approving 
technologies for accessing the network. Accordingly, accepting payments from 
mobile wallets creates a risk of patent infringement liability for merchants. 
f. Cost of Accepting Payments 
Beyond tender and routing choices, digital wallets raise the possibility of 
potential increases in the costs of accepting payment. The addition of digital wallet 
providers into the payment ecosystem means that there are additional mouths at 
the table. Digital wallet providers expect to be compensated for their services, and 
this compensation must come from somewhere. Apple, for example, reportedly 
receives fifteen basis points on every ApplePay transaction.123 These fifteen basis 
points are paid by the card issuer, which reduces the issuer’s profits. As ApplePay’s 
transaction volume grows, these fifteen basis points will become increasingly 
significant to issuers, who will be incentivized to recover them from other parties, 
such as by pressuring the Card Networks to increase interchange fees. 
The Card Networks, too, may look at digital wallets as a revenue source. 
Thus Visa created a “tokenization” fee, reportedly seven cents per token and 
two cents per decline, which it waived for the first year,124 before later 
suspending the fee for issuers that do their processing through Visa.125 It 
would not be surprising if Visa were to reinstitute the fees once issuers have 
sufficiently committed—and become locked into—tokenization. 
Similarly, MasterCard has created “digital enablement fees” for both 
issuers and acquirers.126 Issuers are subject to a 50-cent “digitization” fee for 
 
122 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 136-38 (1970). 
123 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
124 See VISA CEO Confirms Tokens as New Network Revenue Stream, supra note 50 (noting that 
Visa “put a rate schedule out there for tokenization,” though Visa waived tokenization fees for 2015). 
125 See John Stewart, With New Digital Program, Visa Drops Token Fees, Offers Issuers Single Connection to 
All Services, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (June 2, 2015), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/with-new-digital-
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CHRU]. 
126 See Jim Daly, As Card-Industry Use of Tokens Increases, MasterCard Plans “Digital Enablement” Fees, 
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/as-card-industry-use-of-
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the provision of a token and a “Digital Enablement Service Lifecycle 
Management” fee of 10 cents per month for a tokenized PAN, as well as a fee 
of 2.5 cents for calls to its “alternate network application programming 
interface.”127 Acquirers are charged one basis point on select card-not-present 
transaction volumes.128 
Additionally, as discussed earlier in subsection II.B.2.b, the networks are 
likely to charge for PAR numbers that stand in for a PAN with a tokenized 
payment in order to facilitate fraud detection, returns, and loyalty programs. 
The PAR is necessary only because of tokenization, which many merchants 
do not want; through tokenization, the Card Networks are in a position to 
charge merchants more for a less valuable product. 
When considering all of the risks posed by digital wallets, it is not clear if 
there is a compelling general value proposition for their acceptance by 
merchants. On the one hand, digital wallets offer the possibility of better data 
security and integration of loyalty programs with payments. On the other hand, 
they pose the specter of loss of data through tokenization, loss of control over 
customer data and the customer relationship, undifferentiated security risks, 
greater liability, and higher costs of payment acceptance both because of tender 
and routing shifts and because of additional fees. The tradeoffs may vary by 
merchant and by digital wallet; it may well be that in some cases it makes sense 
for a merchant to accept a digital wallet. Because of the Honor All Wallets rules, 
however, merchants are not able to select which digital wallets they wish to 
accept and on what terms. The result is to preclude merchants from protecting 
their own interest or from seeking out favorable deals with individual digital 
wallet providers. Thus it does not even matter how compelling a business 
proposition a particular digital wallet offers to a merchant; the merchant will 
have to accept that digital wallet on the same terms as all other digital wallets 
if it accepts any payments that use that wallet’s communications technology. 
3. The Honor All Wallets Rules 
At this point we have seen how there is a tremendous variety in digital 
wallet product design. Different digital wallets present different cost–benefit 
propositions to consumers and merchants. As discussed in subsection II.A.3, 
consumers have the ability to eschew use of digital wallets and to pick the 
particular wallet(s) they wish to use. This provides consumers with some 
(imperfect) measure of protection against riskier products. 
For merchants, however, the range of costs and benefits across digital 
wallets is more problematic. Merchants lack the “just say no” option because 
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of the combination of creeping technology mandates and certain Card 
Network rules that limit their ability to selectively accept digital wallets. 
Presently, merchant acceptance of digital wallets is limited. Virtually all 
merchants accept payments through only a limited number of technologies, 
either because they lack the equipment to accept other technologies or 
because they have not chosen to activate the equipment features that would 
accept other technologies.129 Moreover, there is currently no mandate in the 
United States for merchants to accept payments through any particular type 
of technology. Yet signs point in this direction, including the imposition of 
Card Network technology mandates in Europe, Canada, and Australia.130 
Even without technology mandates, however, there is no going backward 
in payment systems. Once a system is turned on, as a business matter, there’s 
no turning it off. Turning off a payment system risks alienating customers 
and losing transactions from customers who have relied upon acceptance of 
their system or device. Moreover, NFC contactless technology in particular 
is rapidly becoming the new standard for in-person payments.131 Given how 
important digital wallets are expected to be in twenty-first century retailing, 
and the significance of path dependence and first-mover advantages, the 
terms under which merchants end up accepting digital wallets will have an 
enormous effect on the shape of retailing and payments. 
a. The Honor All Wallets Rules 
If merchants were free to pick and choose which digital wallets they wished 
to accept or to condition their acceptance, then merchants could evaluate the 
basis on which they were willing to accept the costs imposed by any particular 
digital wallet. That, however, is not the situation merchants face today. 
All of the Card Networks have network rules binding on their acquirer and 
issuer members.132 Card Network rules are incorporated by reference in 
 
129 For example, in mid-2016, only around two million of the thirteen million point-of-sale terminals in 
the United States were equipped to accept NFC payments. See Karen Webster, UK’s Lessons for U.S. Mobile 
Payments Adoption, PYMNTS.COM (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.pymnts.com/nfc/2016/uk-lessons-for-us-
mobile-payments-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/MM3E-U358] (describing the number of terminals that can 
accept NFC payments). These terminals represent some 15% of terminals, but 21% of merchants. Press 
Release, Javelin Strategy, A Third of U.S. Retail Establishments to Accept Contactless Cards by 2019 in a 
Second Wave of EMV (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/press-release/third-us-retail-
establishments-accept-contactless-cards-2019-second-wave-emv [https://perma.cc/9NXA-5846]. 
130 See Webster, supra note 129. 
131 The vast majority of new POS terminals in the U.S. and worldwide are NFC equipped. See 
Merchants Worldwide Are Installing More Contactless Terminals—And Turning on NFC, DIGITAL 
TRANSACTIONS (Feb. 17 2015), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/merchants-worldwide-are-installing-
more-contactless-terminals-and-turning-on-ntc [https://perma.cc/V4PS-Y26S] (noting that 75% of new POS 
terminals in the U.S. in 2014 were NFC capable); see also Press Release, Javelin Strategy, supra note 129. 
132 See Levitin, supra note 9, at 1324. 
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merchant contracts. For example, Visa requires that acquirers have a merchant 
agreement with every merchant that takes Visa cards.133 The merchant agreement 
must include language requiring the merchant to comply with all the Visa Rules, 
including those regarding acceptance.134 Thus, even though merchants may lack 
direct contractual dealings with Visa, they are nonetheless bound by its rules. 
Among these rules are the “Honor All Cards” rules requiring merchants 
to accept all cards carrying the Card Network’s logo.135 The Card Networks 
interpret their Honor All Cards rules to be “Honor All Wallets” rules, 
meaning that merchants are required to accept all devices set up to transact 
through the Card Network if the merchant accepts payments using the 
communications technology employed by the device.136 For example, Visa’s 
Honor All Cards rule mandates that any “U.S. Merchant that wishes to accept 
Visa Cards must accept any valid Visa Card in its category of acceptance that 
a Cardholder properly presents for payment.”137 A “Visa Card” is defined for 
 
133 VISA CORE RULES, supra note 26, § 1.5.2.1 (“An Acquirer must have a Merchant Agreement 
with each of its Merchants to accept Visa Cards.”). 
134 See id. (“The Merchant Agreement must include language that requires the Merchant to do all of 
the following[:] . . . Comply with the Visa Rules regarding use of the Visa-Owned Marks, Visa acceptance, 
risk management, Transaction processing, and any Visa products, programs, or services in which the 
Merchant is required to, or chooses to, participate . . . .”). For an equivalent requirement imposed by 
MasterCard, see MASTERCARD, MASTERCARD RULES § 5.1.2 (2017), which specifies “[e]ach Merchant 
Agreement must contain the substance of each of the Standards set forth in Rules 5.4 through 5.13 [including 
the Honor All Cards Rule in § 5.8.1], and any other Standards applicable to the nature and manner of the 
Merchant’s business.” 
135 Since a 2003 litigation settlement, there has been a carveout from the MasterCard and Visa 
Honor All Cards rules allowing merchants to choose whether to accept only their credit products, 
only their signature-debit products, or both. Within each category of cards accepted, however, the 
Honor All Cards rule still applies. 
136 It is unclear how the Honor All Wallets rules operate when there is an intermediate payment 
aggregator, such as PayPal or Square. In the payment aggregator model, the aggregator pays the merchant 
using a low-cost payment method, such ACH, and in turn bills the Card Network as if it were the 
merchant. The aggregator business model is based on arbitraging the difference in merchant discount fees 
paid by the aggregator and the merchant. Presumably a merchant that accepts PayPal mobile payments via 
QR technology is not obligated to accept other QR devices because the merchant has not actually received 
a payment from a Card Network directly. Cf. Levitin, Payment Wars, supra note 11, at 479-81. See generally 
Becoming a Payment Facilitator, Payment Service Provider [PSP] or Payment Aggregator, AGILE PAYMENTS, 
https://www.agilepayments.com/downloads/payfac.pdf [https://perma.cc/CXT8-HVMH]. 
137 VISA CORE RULES, supra note 26, § 1.5.4.5. Similarly, MasterCard requires “Merchants 
that choose to accept . . . MasterCard Cards [to] honor all . . . MasterCard Cards without 
discrimination when properly presented for payment.” MASTERCARD, supra note 134, § 5.8.1. 
MasterCard also expressly provides that unless otherwise stated, its rules regarding card acceptance 
also apply to non-card access devices. Id. at 257. American Express likewise requires merchants to “accept 
the Card as payment for goods and services . . . sold . . . at all of your Establishments, except as expressly 
permitted by Applicable Law.” AMERICAN EXPRESS, AMERICAN EXPRESS MERCHANT REFERENCE 
GUIDE § 3.1 (Oct. 2017), https://icm.aezp-state.com/internet/NGMS/US_en/Images/merchantpolicypdfs/
US_RefGuide_NS.pdf [https://perma.cc/A45K-HASZ]. American Express defines “card” to mean “[a]ny 
card, account access device, or payment device or service bearing our or our Affiliates’ Marks and issued by 
an Issuer or a Card Number.” Id. at 55. 
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the U.S. region as “[A Magnetic Stripe and/or a Visa Contactless Payment 
Device] bear[ing] the Visa Brand Mark that enables a Visa Cardholder to 
obtain goods, services, or cash from a Visa Merchant or an Acquirer.”138 Based 
on this definition, Visa’s attorney at a 2013 class action settlement fairness 
hearing represented that “the Master Card and Visa Honor-all-Cards Rules 
apply to both cards but also to other devices including contactless devices.”139 
Similarly, MasterCard requires “Merchants that choose to accept . . . 
MasterCard Cards [to] honor all . . . MasterCard Cards without 
discrimination when properly presented for payment.”140 MasterCard also 
expressly provides that unless otherwise stated, its rules regarding card 
acceptance apply to non-card access devices.141 
American Express likewise requires that “[m]erchants must accept the 
Card as payment for goods and service . . . sold . . . at all of your 
Establishments, except as expressly permitted by Applicable Law.”142 
The Honor All Wallets rules tie acceptance of traditional plastic-based card 
payments with acceptance of non-card devices that utilize the same 
communications technology. If a merchant accepts a Card Network brand 
payments using a given type of communications technology—magnetic stripe, 
NFC, QR code, etc.—the merchant must accept the Card Network brand 
payments from all devices using that technology. A merchant may not accept only 
certain devices using a technology. Thus if a merchant is willing to accept 
magnetic stripe payments, it must also accept emulated magnetic stripe 
payments, such as those used by SamsungPay.143 Likewise, if a merchant is willing 
to take payment through NFC, for example, the merchant must accept all 
network-approved NFC payment devices, such as ApplePay and Google Pay.144 
 
138 VISA CORE RULES, supra note 26, at 793. 
139 Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 38, In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant 
Discount Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1720 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2013). 
140 MASTERCARD, supra note 134, § 5.8.1. 
141 Id. at 257. 
142 AMERICAN EXPRESS, supra note 137, § 3.1. 
143 Emulated magnetic strip payments, also known as magnetic secure transmission, send a 
magnetic signal from a device to a nearby card reader that emulates swiping a physical card with 
additional security. See What is MST? (Magnetic Secure Transmission), SAMSUNG, 
http://www.samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00043865/ [https://perma.cc/VD9C-4R5B]. 
144 Many U.S. merchants that invested in accepting contactless NFC payments did so before 
ApplePay was released in October 2014, at a time when NFC payments were made almost exclusively 
through traditional plastic cards with NFC RFID chips in them rather than through digital wallets using 
NFC technology. See Matt Hemblen, Despite Apple, NFC Is Catching On—Just Not for Payments Quite Yet, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 19, 2012, 6:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/
2493828/mobile-payments/despite-apple-nfc-is-catching-on-just-not-for-payments-quite-yet.html 
[https://perma.cc/K4ZX-NUYX]. The Honor All Wallets rules, along with the rise of NFC digital 
wallets, may change the implications of these merchants’ investments. 
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The Honor All Wallets rules not only require acceptance of all wallets 
using a certain technology, but also nondiscrimination among devices and 
among technologies. Therefore a merchant who takes magnetic stripe 
payments must accept emulated magnetic stripe payments, such as those used 
by SamsungPay, without discrimination. Similarly a merchant that takes NFC 
cards must accept all NFC devices, including devices running ApplePay and 
Google Pay wallets, without discrimination. 
The inability to discriminate on terms of acceptance not only means that 
merchants cannot price for the risks imposed by particular wallets, but also 
impedes merchants’ ability to partner with wallet providers. A merchant might 
want to partner with a particular digital wallet provider to gain access to the wallet 
as a platform for advertising and loyalty programs. The Honor All Wallets rules 
would permit such a partnership, but the merchant could not discriminate in 
favor of its partner to encourage use of its wallet. As a result, merchants’ incentive 
to partner with a particular digital wallet provider is reduced; they are instead 
incentivized to partner with the Card Network itself to gain access to all wallets. 
Currently, U.S. merchants are not mandated to accept payments using 
any particular technology. This situation may well change, however. Since 
2014, contactless payment acceptance has been required in Australia and for 
all new and upgraded point-of-sale terminals in Canada.145 Furthermore, 
MasterCard has mandated that all card-present merchants in Europe accept 
contactless payments with NFC technology by 2020,146 and Visa has issued a 
contactless acceptance mandate for the U.K. by 2020.147 It would seem, then, 
only a matter of time before there is a contactless mandate in the U.S.148 
In the U.S., Visa has given indications that it considers magnetic stripe 
technology a legacy system that will be phased out as new cards and new 
contactless readers are required to support not only the magnetic stripe data 
 
145 See SMART PAYMENT ASS’N, AN OVERVIEW OF CONTACTLESS PAYMENT ACCEPTANCE 
BENEFITS AND WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENTS §§ 3.2–3.3 (2016), https://www.smartpaymentassociation.
com/images/news/16-04-26-SPA-Contactless-Payment-Benefits-WP-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CN5-
TLQA]. 
146 See Press Release, MasterCard, MasterCard Fast Tracks Mobile Payment Acceptance in Europe 
Helping Europeans to Tap Everywhere by 2020 (Sept. 10, 2014), http://newsroom.mastercard.com/press-
releases/mastercard-fast-tracks-mobile-payment-acceptance-europe-helping-europeans-tap-everywhere-
2020/ [https://perma.cc/5AQN-8E5Q]. 
147 See Press Release, Visa, The Contactless Transaction Threshold Increases to £30 Today. 
Visa Europe Welcomes This New Threshold Increase and Believes It Will Be the Most Significant 
to Date (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.visa.co.uk/newsroom/the-contactless-transaction-threshold-
increases-to-ps30-today-visa-europe-welcomes-this-new-threshold-increase-and-believes-it-will-
be-the-most-1241648 [https://perma.cc/MK5B-AM9U]. 
148 A similar pattern of rollouts can be observed with the adoption of EMV, with the U.S. 
being the last region to adopt the technology. See Tina Orem, Global EMV Adoption Leaps; U.S. Still 
Lags, CREDIT UNION TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.cutimes.com/2017/01/05/global-emv-
adoption-leaps-us-still-lags [https://perma.cc/8U5J-SBE4]. 
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interface, but also contactless chip functionality.149 Moreover, the majority of 
new point-of-sale terminals in the United States are now shipped with NFC 
capability.150 U.S. merchants may well find themselves required to accept 
NFC payments in the near future, and thus to accept all NFC wallets. 
b. Problems Identifying Digital Wallets 
Even without the Honor All Wallets rules, merchants would have limited 
ability to accept digital wallets selectively because they cannot identify the 
particular digital wallet used or even if a digital wallet is being used. When a 
consumer pays with a digital wallet based on a smartphone using NFC 
communication, for example, the merchant cannot determine whether an 
NFC-enabled card or an NFC-enabled digital wallet was used, much less 
which wallet on the smartphone was used. Likewise, because of magnetic 
stripe emulation technology merchants cannot tell if SamsungPay or a 
traditional magnetic swipe card has been used for a transaction absent physical 
observation. While such observation is possible for some merchants, it is not 
possible for others, including those with self-service kiosks or even those with 
registers where the consumer is the party to handle the point-of-sale terminal. 
Although Card Networks have typically required card issuers to provide 
a “Form Factor Indicator,” “device type value,” or other form of offline data 
authentication to identify the device being used to make the transaction,151 
merchants interviewed for this Article uniformly claim that card issuers are 
not in fact providing form factor information, despite the presence of a data 
field for such information. As a result, merchants do not even know with 
which digital wallets they are dealing. 
All in all, then, merchants are not able to identify digital wallets, but even 
if they could, they would still be prohibited from selective or conditional 
acceptance of digital wallets that use a particular communications technology 
through which they already accept payments made on a Card Network brand. 
A merchant cannot decide to take one type of digital wallet, but not another, 
if the wallets use the same basic communications technology, even if the risks 
 
149 See VISA TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE GUIDE, supra note 37, at 240. 
150 See Stewart, supra note 125 (noting that 75% of new POS terminals shipped in 2014 were 
NFC capable). 
151 See, e.g., MASTERCARD, supra note 134, at 203 (“An Issuer must ensure that each contactless-
enabled MasterCard Card or Access Device newly issued or re-issued on or after 18 October 2013 is 
personalized with the appropriate device type value.”); VISA CORE RULES, supra note 26, § 4.1.22.10 (“All 
contactless chip cards issued on or after 1 October 2015 must support offline data authentication.”). Visa’s 
technical standard for offline data authentication, VCPS 2.1, includes a form factor indicator.  See VISA 
TRANSACTION ACCEPTANCE DEVICE GUIDE, supra note 37. The form factor indicator must be sent to 
Visa by the Acquirer if present in the card. See VISA, VISA SMART DEBIT/CREDIT AND VISA PAYWAVE 
126 (2016), https://www.visa.com/chip/merchants/grow-your-business/payment-technologies/credit-card-
chip/docs/visa-emv-merchant-aig.pdf [https://perma.cc/55B3-53FE]. 
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involved in different wallets vary materially. In other words, the Honor All 
Wallets rules tie acceptance of different types of payment devices using the 
same basic communications technology. Acceptance of traditional magnetic 
stripe transactions is tied to acceptance of digital wallets using magnetic stripe 
emulation; acceptance of NFC transactions from plastic cards is tied to 
acceptance of NFC transactions from various digital wallets; acceptance of 
Internet transactions is tied to acceptance of digital wallets using Internet 
communication; and acceptance of one digital wallet using a communications 
technology is tied to the acceptance of all digital wallets using that technology. 
c. Antitrust Implications of the Honor All Wallets Rules 
The Honor All Wallets rules raise credible antitrust concerns about illegal 
restraint of trade.152 The Honor All Wallets rules restrict merchants’ ability 
to accept digital wallets selectively or conditionally. This enables the Card 
Networks to maintain their market power in the overall payment card market 
in the face of technological transformation. Absent the Honor All Wallets 
rules’ restraint on merchants, more digital wallets would compete by offering 
cheaper payments using PIN-debit and ACH. 
The Honor All Wallets rules also operate as a type of tying arrangement 
that ties together plastic cards and digital wallets and thereby also ties the 
markets in the related products of plastic Card Network services and digital 
wallet network services. This tying enables the Card Networks to expand their 
market share in the digital wallet network services area, particularly as token 
service providers. Accordingly, the Honor All Wallets rules should invite 
serious scrutiny by competition regulators and could presage private litigation. 
d. From Honor All Cards to Honor All Wallets 
The Honor All Wallets rules are an expanded interpretation of the Card 
Networks’ Honor All Cards rules. The traditional Honor All Cards rules required 
merchants to accept all types of cards—credit and debit, rewards and non-rewards, 
co-brands and non-co-brands—from all issuers.153 And for traditional credit card 
transactions, variation among issuers is immaterial to merchants: all issuers (and 
acquirers) are FDIC-insured financial institutions, and the payments from the 
 
152 An assumption of this analysis is that there is no collusion between the Card Networks; 
such collusion would raise different and additional antitrust issues. Likewise, a consideration of the 
antitrust issues presented by the EMVCo LLC joint venture and of its reported limited licensing of 
its tokenization specification is beyond the scope of this Article. 
153 See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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issuers to the acquirer are guaranteed by the Card Network.154 Merchants, 
therefore, have no reason to price differentially solely on the basis of card issuer 
(other than differences in chargeback policy by issuers). 
Variations in type of card, however, present a different set of concerns for 
merchants than do variations in issuer. The Honor All Cards rules effectively 
tie acceptance of one type of card with acceptance of other types of cards. 
This is a problem for merchants because different types of cards entail 
different costs and risks. For example, rewards cards bear higher interchange 
fees than non-rewards cards. These higher interchange fees get passed along 
to merchants in their merchant discount fee, yet merchants see no marginal 
benefit from accepting rewards cards.155 Because the Honor All Cards rules 
require merchants to accept all of these cards on the same terms, merchants 
cannot discriminate between high-cost and low-cost cards. 
The Honor All Cards rules also historically tied acceptance of the 
Card Networks’ credit cards to the acceptance of the Card Networks’ 
signature-debit cards.156 Signature-debit cards—cards for which transactions 
are authorized by a signature rather than a PIN—have higher interchange fees 
than PIN-debit cards and are inherently less secure, increasing chargeback risk 
for merchants.157 The Honor All Cards rules, however, required merchants to 
accept the more expensive and less secure signature-debit cards as a condition 
of taking credit card payments, enabling entry into the payments market by 
an inferior product at the expense of the PIN-debit products. 
The Honor All Cards rules have been the subject of two rounds of major 
antitrust litigation that have resulted in some of the largest private litigation 
settlements in history. The first round of the litigation, dealing with the tying of 
credit and signature-debit cards by MasterCard and Visa, resulted in a $3.05 billion 
class action settlement (and numerous private settlements by class opt-outs) and a 
temporary relaxation of the rule to allow merchants to accept credit cards without 
accepting signature-debit cards.158 The second round of litigation focused on the 
tying of rewards cards with non-rewards cards (a tying bolstered by certain other 
 
154 See VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS 604 (2013), https://usa.visa.com/
dam/VCOM/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulations-main.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SF6A-2HD7]. 
155 See Levitin, supra note 9, at 1391 (“If the honor-all-cards rule was eliminated, merchants would 
likely refuse to accept cards that had high interchange fees (and hence high merchant discount fees).”). 
156 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Defendants have an ‘honor all cards’ policy, which requires any merchant accepting any of their 
credit cards to accept all of their payment cards.”). 
157 See Levitin, supra note 9, at 1323 tbl.1 (illustrating that signature-debit cards cost U.S. 
retailers more per transaction on average than do PIN-debit cards). The inherent security limitations 
on signature debit cards are apparent in that they do not allow for cash back at point-of-sale; there 
is no such thing as a signature ATM card. 
158 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507-508 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
366 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 305 
Card Network rules). It initially resulted in a $7.25 billion class action settlement 
that was then thrown out on appeal.159 Critically, although the proposed settlement 
would have allowed merchants to surcharge for cards in some situations, it would 
not have affected the Honor All Cards rules and would have in fact permanently 
enjoined all merchants (including those not yet in existence) from challenging the 
rule.160 
The Honor All Wallets rules are formally interpretations of the Honor 
All Cards rules. Functionally, however, they are new restraints that enable the 
Card Networks to maintain their power in the credit and debit card markets, 
both in terms of card acceptance for merchants and of market power over 
issuing banks and consumers as technological advances move the market into 
digital wallets. As such, the transformation of the Honor All Cards rules into 
Honor All Wallets rules raises the same fundamental problems that existed 
in past applications of the Honor All Cards rules. 
At the same time, however, the Honor All Wallets rules do more than the 
Honor All Cards rule. The Honor All Cards rules were an intrabrand restriction: 
they required a merchant that accepted one Visa card to accept them all. The Honor 
All Wallets rules, however, function as an interbrand restriction: if a merchant 
accepts Visa contactless cards, the merchant must also accept all Visa payments on 
all NFC devices. That means that the merchant cannot elect to accept only 
MasterCard NFC (or PIN-debit, or ACH) payments from mobile wallets. Because 
a digital wallet can contain multiple brands’ cards, the Honor All Wallets rules 
function as an interbrand restriction, not merely an intrabrand restriction. This 
difference is significant, because—as explained in the next subsection—antitrust 
law is much more skeptical of interbrand restrictions than intrabrand restrictions. 
e. Harms to Competition 
Antitrust law is about protecting competition, not competitors. Therefore, 
antitrust violations require injuries to competition. Although the Honor All 
Wallets rules restrict merchants’ ability to bargain for the terms under which they 
accept payments and effectively impose significant risks and costs on merchants, 
those consequences do not amount to an injury to competition and thus do not 
establish grounds for antitrust liability. The Honor All Wallets rules do, however, 
injure competition by restricting competition for network services at point-of-
sale (as opposed to online). This has the effect of foreclosing the entry of digital 
wallets utilizing lower-cost point-of-sale payment methods, such as PIN-debit 
and ACH payments. Not only does this foreclosure harm competing digital 
 
159 See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 
207, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d, 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016). 
160 See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee, 827 F.3d at 238-39. 
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wallets, but it also harms merchants by forcing them to deal with a market in 
which prices are artificially inflated because of reduced competition. 
Absent the Honor All Wallets rules, it is not clear that there would be a 
market for open digital wallets that make payments from the Card Networks’ 
credit and signature-debit accounts. Consumers will only use such digital wallets 
if merchants accept them. Merchants, however, have little reason to accept Card 
Network payments through digital wallets. Merchants face additional costs for 
accepting digital wallets, including potential loss of customer data, additional 
fees, and various security (and litigation) risks. Digital wallets do not generally 
offer sufficiently offsetting benefits, particularly because all consumers with 
digital wallets also have plastic payment cards (and are usually carrying them). 
Merchants are thus unlikely to lose many sales by not accepting digital wallet 
payments. Moreover, unlike the shift from cash to plastic cards, the shift from 
plastic cards to digital wallets does not enable greater consumer consumption 
and therefore merchant sales. Instead, there would be only additional value to a 
merchant from accepting a Card Network payment on a digital wallet if the 
merchant partnered with the digital wallet provider to gain access to the digital 
wallet as an advertising and loyalty program platform. 
Open digital wallets, however, need not make Card Network payments. 
Instead, they can make payments using low-cost payment systems like ACH 
or PIN-debit cards, such as with staged wallets like PayPal. ACH is a very 
low-cost payment system that is not associated with any device; it is often 
used for direct deposit and automatic bill pay. ACH payments merely require 
transmission of the payor and payee’s bank account and routing numbers and 
the payment amount to the payor or payee’s financial institutions. 
A digital wallet can make ACH a much more consumer-friendly payment 
system. Instead of having to remember a sequence of disembodied bank 
account and routing numbers, a consumer can enter that information into a 
digital wallet once and then use that digital wallet much like a debit card. 
Likewise, a digital wallet can be used to make PIN debit card payments. While 
PIN debit card transactions are more expensive for merchants than ACH 
transactions, they are much cheaper than transactions on both the Card Networks’ 
signature debit cards and credit cards. Thus, absent the Honor All Wallets rules, 
one would expect to see merchants accepting digital wallets selectively and on a 
bargained-for basis, with digital wallets that offer ACH or PIN-debit payments 
having a substantial advantage because of the lower cost of those payments. 
The Honor All Wallets rules get the Card Networks around the problem 
that merchants are not generally attracted to digital wallets that use their cards. 
The Honor All Wallets rules prevent merchants from being able to accept 
digital wallets selectively or conditionally if the merchant also takes plastic 
cards. A merchant might want to accept only ACH and PIN-debit payments 
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from digital wallets, but cannot under the Honor All Wallets rules. Instead, 
the merchant must also accept digital wallets that make payments on the Card 
Network’s credit and signature-debit networks. Similarly, merchants might 
simply refuse to accept credit and signature debit–based digital wallets. But if 
a merchant accepts Visa’s contactless NFC plastic cards, however, the 
merchant must also accept all Visa payments on NFC-based digital wallets. 
The merchant has no option of accepting only PIN-debit payments with 
digital wallets. The Honor All Wallets rules thus help the Card Networks gain 
entry to the digital wallet market despite offering noncompetitive products. 
The Honor All Wallets rules do more, however, than help the Card 
Networks gain entry into the digital wallet market. Because of the unusual 
structure of payment systems, to the extent that a consumer adopts a digital 
wallet that uses the Card Network’s cards, that consumer is unlikely to also 
use ACH or PIN debit digital wallets. 
Payment systems are “two-sided” markets with two types of “consumers”: 
payors (issuers and consumers) and payees (acquirers and merchants).161 A 
payment system is of no value to payors if payees refuse to accept payments using 
the system, and to payees if payors refuse to make payments using the system. 
Instead, to make a two-sided market viable, there needs to be a threshold number 
of both types of “consumers.” The two-sided nature of payment systems markets 
creates a “chicken-and-egg” problem for new systems—payors won’t join the 
system unless enough payees accept it, and vice-versa.162 The reason for this is that 
payment systems have strong “network effects,” meaning that the value of 
participating in the system is increased (or decreased) by the number of other 
types of participants in the system. The more merchants accept a payment 
method, the more valuable the payment method is to consumers, and vice versa.163 
Industries with network effects have natural barriers to entry. Moreover, to 
the extent that both payors and payees tend to use only one type of payment 
product, the adoption of one system operates to exclude other systems by 
making it impossible for other systems to surmount the network effects, because 
too many of the potential network participants are already committed to the first 
system. This is likely the case with device-based digital wallets. Whereas 
consumers may use multiple online digital wallets offered by various merchants, 
they are unlikely to load multiple general-purpose digital wallets onto mobile 
devices. Instead, consumers are likely to load and use a single general-purpose 
digital wallet, which may itself contain only one linked card. Therefore, to the 
 
161 See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text. 
162 See Levitin, supra note 9, at 1365 (describing two-sided networks’ chicken-and-egg problem 
“in which it is impossible to attract one type of customer without having first attracted the other”). 
163 Id. at 1364-65 (“[A] network’s value to its participants depends on the network’s size.”). 
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extent that a consumer adopts a particular digital wallet, that consumer is not 
available for other digital wallets to overcome the “chicken and egg” problem. 
The Honor All Wallets rules help the Card Networks swamp rival networks 
competing for access to digital wallets. The rules enable the Networks to gain 
entry to the digital wallet market because it ensures merchant acceptance, and 
thus consumer willingness to use wallets that use the Card Networks’ cards. With 
entry achieved and their market share artificially increased, the Card Networks 
can then divert part of the higher fees merchants are charged on their payments 
to consumers in the form of rewards, incentivizing them to use the digital wallets 
with the Card Networks’ cards, rather than digital wallets with PIN or ACH. 
The situation is analogous to the Honor All Cards rules’ tying of 
signature-debit acceptance to credit card acceptance. Signature-debit is a 
more expensive and riskier product than PIN-debit, and many merchants 
would have preferred to accept only PIN-debit products and credit cards, not 
signature-debit. But when merchants were forced to accept signature-debit 
as well as PIN-debit, signature-debit flourished because part of the higher 
interchange fees on the signature-debit were rebated back to consumers by 
the Card Networks and their issuers as “rewards” to encourage the use of the 
signature-debit product.164 The Honor All Wallets rules work similarly to 
foreclose entry to digital wallets offering ACH and PIN-debit payments.165 
 
164 See also supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
165 The Honor All Wallets rules may also have the ironic effect of foreclosing entry to digital wallets 
that use communications technology other than NFC; Honor All Wallets could, in fact, ultimately mean 
only “Honor Only NFC Wallets.” The Honor All Wallets rules do not require the acceptance of any 
particular communications technology by merchants, only the acceptance of all devices using a 
communications channel the merchant already accepts. The adoption of the EMV liability shift rule has 
incentivized many merchants to invest in new EMV-capable point-of-sale terminals. See supra notes 
44–46 and accompanying text. Virtually all EMV Chip terminals sold today come with the hardware 
capability of accepting Chip, magnetic stripe, and NFC payments. Moreover, for at least some 
manufacturers, the default setting is that all three communication channels are activated on installation. 
Although merchants can disable the NFC hardware, the mere fact that they already have the hardware 
means that the number of merchants that can readily accept NFC payments is greatly expanded, thereby 
surmounting part of the chicken-and-egg problem of technology acceptance in two-sided markets. 
This expansion of NFC-equipped merchants may have the effect of foreclosing entry for mobile wallets 
that use other technologies, because the acquisition and certification of EMV Chip terminals can eat up several 
years of a merchant’s payment technology budget, leaving no funds for acquiring the hardware necessary to 
accept payments that use other communications technologies. Moreover, activating hardware for other 
communication technologies would necessitate EMV recertification, adding to the adoption cost. 
NFC technology is the favored technology of mobile wallets backed by EMV members (i.e., 
the Card Networks) because NFC payments “ride their rails.” Indeed, MasterCard and Visa are 
among the Sponsor-level members of the NFC Forum, which controls the NFC technical 
specifications and provides NFC device manufacturers with compliance certification. See supra note 
2. The EMV liability shift helps further the adoption of NFC, and this in turn benefits the Card 
Networks. Unless the Card Networks are taking steps to encourage device manufacturers to produce 
NFC-capable devices, however, this particular impact of the Honor All Wallets rules is unlikely to 
constitute an antitrust violation. See infra subsection II.B.3.f.ii. 
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f. Possible Antitrust Violations 
i. Unreasonable Vertical Nonprice Restraint of Trade 
Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits every “contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade.”166 Since 1967, this 
language has been held to prohibit vertical nonprice restraints—contract 
terms imposed by a seller on a buyer that limit the terms on which the buyer 
may do business.167 The Honor All Wallets rules are one such restraint 
because they limit the terms on which the ultimate buyer of a payment 
transaction (the merchant) may do business on other transactions, including the 
ability to take exclusively other types of payments over mobile devices. 
A vertical nonprice restraint is not inherently illegal. Instead, the legality of 
vertical nonprice restraints, like almost all types of Section One violations, 
depends on whether it is an “unreasonable” restraint under antitrust’s “Rule of 
Reason,” which balances pro- and anti-competitive effects.168 As typically 
applied, the Rule of Reason requires the plaintiff first to show that the restraint 
would have an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market, either by 
showing an actual likely adverse effect or by demonstrating that the defendant 
exercises market power (as a surrogate for actual effects). The burden then shifts 
to the defendant to show that there is a pro-competitive justification. If the 
defendant makes such a showing, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to 
show that the pro-competitive effects could be achieved via less restrictive 
means.169 
Applying the Rule of Reason, it is clear that the Honor All Wallets rules 
likely have adverse effects on competition in the market for digital wallet 
services. The Honor All Wallets rules restrict merchants’ ability to bargain about 
the terms under which they accept digital wallets and in so doing foreclose entry 
by digital wallets that utilize lower-cost payment systems like PIN-debit and 
ACH. Moreover, the Card Networks each likely have market power—the ability 
to materially affect prices—in the payment card market. As of 2016, Visa had a 
 
166 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
167 See Jeffrey M. Knetsch, Note, A Uniform Rule of Reason for Vertical and Horizontal Nonprice 
Restraints, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 441-442 (1982) (discussing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & 
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). Although the classic vertical nonprice restraint is a geographical resale 
limitation, there is no prescribed form for a vertical nonprice restraint other than that it be a restraint 
on trade imposed on a buyer by a seller. Id. at 444-46. 
168 See generally Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues (June 
1981), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Antitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWA5-X6SR]. 
169 See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997). But cf. Gabriel A. 
Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
561, 583 (2009) (noting “there is no uniformity in the application or even statement of the [Rule of Reason] 
test, either across or within the federal circuits”). For an illustration of how the Rule of Reason applies to 
vertical nonprice restraints, see Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720-25 (1988). 
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49% share of purchase volume on payment cards, MasterCard 21%, and 
American Express 11%.170 All three Card Networks have been previously found 
to have market power in the credit card market,171 and MasterCard and Visa have 
been found to have market power in the debit card market.172 
Beyond the inevitable antitrust arguments over market definition and the 
presence of market power, the Card Networks’ likely response to a challenge of 
their Honor All Wallets rules would be to argue that the rules are necessary to 
help them enter the digital wallet market given the presence of network effects. 
Put another way, the Honor All Wallets rules are necessary to break through 
the chicken-and-egg problem to ensure initial adoption of digital wallets. 
The Card Networks would also likely raise a type of consumer 
benefit/consumer protection argument, based on the Second Circuit’s holding 
that market definition (and market power analysis) in a two-sided network 
context requires analysis of effects on both sides of the market.173 Thus the 
Card Networks would likely argue that if a merchant does not accept all digital 
wallets then cardholders will be liable to discover that, even though the store 
advertises that it accepts the Card Network’s cards, his Card Network card on 
a digital wallet is not accepted. The consumer protection concern here is that 
the consumer would either suffer embarrassment at having payment denied or 
would ultimately be frustrated in his ability to perform a transaction, having 
reasonably relied upon the advertisement that the Card Network’s cards were 
accepted and having brought only a digital wallet—not physical cards—to the 
store. Thus, the argument goes, the Honor All Wallets rules are necessary to 
protect the Card Network’s payment system because if consumers are 
unpleasantly surprised, they might leave the system, thereby reducing the 
value of the system for all merchants because of network effects, and 
potentially setting off a vicious cycle of negative network externalities. 
Finally, the Card Networks might make a policy argument encouraging the 
adoption of digital wallets by arguing that they represent a set of systemic 
improvements that benefit merchants and consumers and should be encouraged. 
 
170 See NILSON REP., Oct. 2017, at 8, https://www.nilsonreport.com/publication_newsletter_
archive_issue.php?issue=1119 [https://perma.cc/C9JT-TGFG]. 
171 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d on other 
grounds, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-454, 2017 WL 2444673 (Oct. 16, 2017). For 
credit cards, Visa has a 46% market share, American Express 21%, and MasterCard 21% based on 
2016 purchase volumes. NILSON REP., supra note 170, at 8; see also United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 
344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that MasterCard and Visa have market power in the credit 
and charge card network services market). 
172 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., No. 96-CV-5238(JG), 2003 WL 
1712568, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2003). For debit cards, Visa has a 51% market share based on 2016 
purchase volume, MasterCard a 22% market share, and the various PIN-debit networks combine for 
18% market share. See NILSON REP., supra note 170, at 8. 
173 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 206. 
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In particular, digital wallets can offer improved transaction security and 
integrated advertising, coupons, rewards, and web browsing—a set of benefits 
which inure to both consumers and merchants. The Honor All Wallets rules, 
according to this argument, are necessary to facilitate the socially beneficial 
adoption of digital wallets (in part because of the network effects problem). 
There is reason to be skeptical of these arguments. The network effects 
argument raises the question of whether a product is worthwhile if the only 
way it can successfully be adopted is through a vertical restraint of trade.174 
Moreover, many digital wallets are used for Internet-based payments, where 
the networks have long overcome any network effects problem; indeed, 
payment-card payments are the dominant form of Internet payments. 
The consumer protection argument likewise does not ring true for digital 
wallets. Because there are no mandates requiring digital technology, a consumer 
with a digital wallet cannot reasonably be confident that any particular merchant 
will have the technical capability of accepting payments from a digital wallet. 
The reasonableness of consumer expectations is premised upon the existence of 
Honor All Wallets rules. Indeed, given the variety of form factors involved with 
digital wallets, it would not be reasonable for a consumer to expect universal 
acceptance, even if the digital wallet displayed a Card Network’s logo. 
Consumers are all too familiar with the limitations of interoperability in the 
digital age; not everyone is able to accept every file format, for 
example—indeed, this is a reason for common file format standards, much like 
the common standards that exist for traditional plastic payment cards. 
Moreover, to the extent that a digital wallet makes Internet payments, there 
is little risk of consumer embarrassment, as it would not likely be a point-of-sale 
transaction. Instead, the consumer would simply have to take another second 
to fish out a traditional plastic card for payment. Even for point-of-sale 
transactions, there is little harm from consumer embarrassment—being told 
that a digital wallet is not accepted is not the same as having a card declined—and 
most consumers still carry physical cards in physical wallets, not just digital 
wallets, and will continue to do so as long as various identity cards, such as 
drivers’ licenses, employee ID cards, and transit passes are not digitized. 
The systemic improvement argument is also lacking. Not only does it not have 
clear legal purchase, it is not even logical on its face. Digital wallets can potentially 
offer various improvements over plastic cards, but not all wallets actually do offer 
such improvements, and the Honor All Wallets rules do not discriminate among 
wallets. Indeed, the rules prevent such discrimination, meaning that the best 
wallets might not in fact win out. If the value proposition in digital wallets is 
 
174 Cf. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “if the only way 
a new product can profitably be introduced is to restrain the legitimate competition of older products, then 
one must seriously wonder whether consumers are genuinely benefitted by the new product”). 
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sensible to merchants, then merchants will adopt them, especially given that 
merchants are already capable of accepting digital wallet payments that use 
communications technologies they already accept, such as magnetic stripe and 
NFC. If merchants were able to negotiate individual deals with digital wallet 
providers, they would likely adopt digital wallets more quickly, because there 
would be clear value propositions for acceptance of those wallets. The Honor All 
Wallets rules may thus actually impede the adoption of digital wallets. 
Even if the various pro-competitive arguments are given credence, they 
are hardly the least restrictive alternative. First, any argument based on 
network effects would presumably hold only during the initial entry period; 
once network effects had been surmounted, then there would be no need for 
the Honor All Wallets rules. Thus, even if the Card Networks’ arguments are 
accepted, the Honor All Wallets rules should be temporally limited. Second, 
there is no need to require acceptance of all devices in order to ensure the 
adoption of particular communications technologies, like NFC or QR codes. 
It is sufficient to require that merchants accept only specified devices. This 
would eliminate merchants’ uncertainty over the risks posed by digital wallets. 
All in all then, it would appear that there is a strong case that the Honor 
All Wallets rules would be found to be an illegal vertical nonprice restraint 
under the Rule of Reason. 
ii. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade Through Tying 
It is also possible to conceptualize the Honor All Wallets rules as tying 
arrangements. Not all tying arrangements are illegal; as the Supreme Court 
has noted, there are “[m]any tying arrangements . . . fully consistent with a 
free, competitive market.”175 Thus the sale of shoes together with laces or cars 
with tires is not thought to pose a competition problem, even though both 
products could be (and are) sold separately. It is only when tying functions to 
restrain trade that it violates the Sherman Act.176 
Historically, the illegality of tying arrangements was evaluated using a “per 
se” standard that involved a four-part inquiry: whether (1) there are actually 
two distinct products or services; (2) there is an actual tying arrangement; (3) 
the defendant has market power for one of the products to which the other is 
tied; and (4) the tying affects a substantial amount of interstate commerce.177 
However, if the consumer would not have purchased the tied product absent 
the tying, there is no cognizable harm to competition, because competing 
 
175 Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S 28, 45 (2006). 
176 Id. at 43-45. 
177 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-16 (1984). 
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non-tied producers did not lose sales.178 Instead, in such circumstances, the 
tying is nothing more than a price increase on the tying product. 
Per se analysis, however, has largely fallen out of vogue in antitrust law; tying 
arrangements are one of the few areas in which it is still used, and even there its 
continuing vitality is in question. Instead, the per se standard has generally been 
replaced by the Rule of Reason, although the applicable standard depends in part 
on how the claim is framed. The per se rule has typically been applied to tying 
arrangements in which the defendant that has power in the tying product market 
will gain power in the tied product market. Indeed, in the Department of Justice’s 
antitrust suit against Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit did not apply a per se analysis, 
but instead used a Rule of Reason analysis for platform software in “industries 
marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts.”179 
Moreover, some tying arrangements are designed to help the defendant better 
maintain its market power in the tying product market. Such cases are likely to 
be reviewed under the Rule of Reason (as occurred in the Microsoft case).180 
The Honor All Wallets rules have aspects of both situations. The Honor 
All Wallets rules function to tie the market for plastic card network services 
(the tying market) to the market for digital wallet network services (the tied 
market). The Card Networks’ motivation for tying is to create market power 
in the digital wallet network services market. The resulting harm is 
foreclosure of entry to competing digital wallets that offer PIN-debit and 
ACH payments, meaning that both the competing digital wallets and their 
potential consumers (merchants and actual consumers) are harmed. This 
would seem to fit within the archetype for which the per se rule is designed. 
On the other hand, there is certainly rapid technological advance in the 
payments industry, even if it is less than clear that digital wallets are a paradigm 
shift. Moreover, excluding PIN-debit and ACH digital wallets could be 
understood as a method of maintaining the Card Networks’ existing market power 
in the overall payment card market as the market is transformed technologically. 
If so, then the focus would be on the tying product, rather than the tied product. 
Thus even if plastic Card Network services and digital wallet network services are 
not separate product markets (as opposed to distinct products), there could still be 
a tying problem. Viewed this way, however, a Rule of Reason analysis would be 
appropriate. The Rule of Reason analysis for a tying claim would look very similar 
to that for a vertical nonprice term restraint. The harm might be defined more 
broadly in a tying case focused on the tying product (namely the ability to swamp 
PIN-debit and ACH payment systems in general, and not just digital wallets using 
 
178 Id. 
179 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
180 Id.; see also Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 33-38. 
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those systems), but otherwise the analysis would seem to be the same, suggesting 
that tying claim might also be viable as an alternative approach. 
If the per se test were ultimately applied, the Honor All Wallets rules would 
appear to be an illegal tying arrangement. The first element of the test requires 
two distinct products or services involved. The need to show two separate 
products is a proxy for efficiency; if the products are too closely related to each 
other (cars and engines; shoes and laces), then their bundling is assumed to be 
efficient and they are not viewed as separate products.181 The tying in this case 
is formally between acceptance of traditional plastic cards and acceptance of 
digital wallets. The Card Networks, however, do not themselves offer plastic 
cards nor do they generally offer digital wallets. Instead, the Card Networks 
provide network services for both plastic cards and digital wallets. 
Functionally, then, what the Honor All Wallets rules do is to tie together the 
market for network services for plastic cards with that for digital wallets. Digital 
network services include additional services beyond plastic network services, 
particularly related to tokenization. The test for distinct products under the per se 
rule is, at a minimum, whether there is consumer demand for both products 
separately.182 The answer here is clearly yes, in that not all merchants accept digital 
wallets currently—for example, merchants who use only “knucklebusters” or take 
cards only by telephone orders—and therefore not all merchants demand digital 
wallet network services. Thus there are distinct services involved in the tying. 
The second element requires an actual tying arrangement. This element is 
easily met. The Honor All Wallets rules are explicit contractual terms conditioning 
the acceptance of one payment device on the acceptance of another. As acceptance 
of these payments requires network services, it also means that if a merchant uses 
plastic network services, it is also required to use digital network services if 
presented with a digital wallet. Because each Card Network has a monopoly over 
network services for its own network, the Honor All Wallets rules also tie together 
plastic and digital network services. Although the Honor All Wallets rules are 
network rules, and the Card Networks do not contract directly with merchants, the 
Card Networks require acquirers to incorporate the Honor All Wallets rules in their 
contracts with merchants, giving merchants the privity needed to raise a tying claim 
based on the Honor All Wallets rules.183 Thus the second element is readily met. 
The third element is that the party imposing the tying arrangement must 
have sufficient economic power in the market for the base product to enable 
 
181 Cf. Jefferson Par. Hosp., 466 U.S. at 15-16. 
182 Id. at 39 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For products to be treated as distinct, the tied product 
must, at a minimum, be one that some consumers might wish to purchase separately without also 
purchasing the tying product.”). 
183 Moreover, merchants would have standing to bring an antitrust claim for this sort of injury 
because they are directly harmed by the reduction in competition. 
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it to restrain trade in the market for the tied product.184 As noted above, all 
of the Card Networks likely have market power in the tying product 
market—the market for plastic card payments. 
The fourth element, involving foreclosure of competition in a substantial 
amount of interstate commerce,185 is also easily met—even though digital 
wallets are still a small percentage of retail payments, they are already a 
substantial dollar amount. The Honor All Wallets rules would therefore 
appear to be an illegal tying arrangement when analyzed under the per se 
rule, as well as under the Rule of Reason. 
CONCLUSION 
Different digital wallets present very different cost–benefit propositions 
to consumers and to merchants. For consumers, there is theoretically 
unrestrained ability to pick and choose whether to use a digital wallet or 
which wallet to use, which suggests that competitive pressure should address 
the risks digital wallets pose to consumers. Unfortunately, the types of risks 
digital wallets present are unlikely to be affected by competitive pressure 
because they are either not salient to consumers or because consumers cannot 
readily differentiate between wallets. This suggests the need for regulatory 
intervention by the CFPB to ensure minimum protections for consumers, 
particularly in terms of privacy, security, dispute resolution, and solvency. 
For merchants, the variation in cost–benefit propositions among digital 
wallets is a much more vexing problem because merchants lack meaningful 
ability to pick and choose whether to accept digital wallets and on what terms. 
The Honor All Wallets rules force merchants to open a set of Pandora’s Boxes. 
They also have the effect of raising barriers to entry for lower-cost digital 
wallets that make PIN-debit and ACH payments. Thus instead of 
technological advances lowering the cost of payments to merchants, the Honor 
All Wallets rules all but ensure that technological advances will raise the cost 
of payments to merchants and prevent them from engaging in beneficial 
partnerships with select digital wallet providers. Ironically, then, rather than 
facilitating the adoption of digital wallets, the Honor All Wallets rules are 
likely to impede the adoption of digital wallets overall. The Honor All Wallets 
rules should be the focus of serious antitrust and regulatory scrutiny. 
Digital wallets hold out tremendous promise for reshaping retail 
commerce. Ensuring that they develop in a fair and competitive marketplace 
is key to realizing on that promise. 
 
184 Jefferson Par. Hosp., 466 U.S. at 13-14 (majority opinion). 
185 Id. at 37 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
